10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
360.
The NDS was
organised around four “key drivers of prosperity”:
•
strengthening
the foundation for economic growth;
•
revitalising
the private sector;
•
improving
quality of life; and
•
strengthening
good governance and improving security.208
361.
DFID officials
in Iraq commented on the NDS: “Better than before (Tokyo)
but
still weak
on identification of priorities and objectives. No understanding
that resource
constraints
will force ITG and donors to make tough choices.” 209
362.
The 15 July
meeting of the ISG considered a draft version of a
paper
from
Dr John Reid, the Defence Secretary, on operational
transition in Iraq (see
363.
Dr Reid
described a process in which Iraqi Security Forces would take
primacy
province by
province. The MNF would take on a reserve role as they did so. So
long
as Iraqi
capacity continued to increase and the security situation did not
deteriorate
seriously,
the transfer would be implemented from October in Maysan and
Muthanna.
Basra and
Dhi Qar would follow in spring 2006. This would lead to a reduced
profile for
UK forces,
and reductions in numbers to around 3,000 by summer
2006.
364.
The ISG made a
number of recommendations for improving the paper,
including
that it
needed to cover more clearly the implications for other government
departments
and
international actors.211
365.
DOP(I) met on
21 July, chaired by Mr Blair, and considered Dr Reid’s paper
on
operational
transition.212
366.
The revised
paper stated:
“It is …
possible that other (FCO and DFID) activity in Iraq aimed at
developing the
Iraqi
Police Service and reconstruction will need to be curtailed or
reduced, with
consequent
implications for HMG’s wider effort, because of the difficulties of
running
projects
without UK military support and protection. This will need to be
looked at in
more detail
with Other Government Departments.” 213
208
Iraqi
Strategic Review Board, 30 June 2005, National
Development Strategy 2005 – 2007.
209
Report
DFID, 11 July 2005, ‘DFID Iraq Weekly Summary, 11
July’.
210
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Iraq Senior Officials, 15 July
2005, ‘MOD Paper on Operational
Transition
in Iraq’ attaching Paper MOD, [undated],‘Operational Transition in
Iraq’.
211
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 15 July 2005, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
212
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I).
213
Paper
Secretary of State for Defence, 18 July 2005, ‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’.
257