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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Introduction and key findings
1.  This Section addresses analysis and findings in relation to the evidence set out in
Sections 16.1 to 16.3, including:
the pressures on Service Personnel, and the welfare support provided to them
and their families;
the arrangements for providing medical care to Service Personnel; and
the arrangements for investigating the deaths of Service Personnel who lost
their lives on Operation TELIC and the support provided for bereaved families.
2.  The provision of military equipment is addressed in Sections 6.3 and 14.
Key findings
In 2002, the UK military was already operating at, and in some cases beyond, the
limits of the guidelines agreed in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review. As a result, the
Harmony Guidelines were being breached for some units and specialist trades.
The Government’s decision to contribute a military force to a US-led invasion of Iraq
inevitably increased the risk that more Service Personnel would be put in breach of
the Harmony Guidelines. The issue of the potential pressure on Service Personnel
was not a consideration in the decision.
The MOD planned and prepared effectively to provide medical care in support of
Operation TELIC.
There were major improvements in the provision of medical care, mental healthcare
and rehabilitative care available to Service Personnel over the course of Op TELIC.
Most of the contacts between the MOD and bereaved families were conducted with
sensitivity. In a few cases, they were not. The MOD progressively improved how it
engaged with and supported bereaved families, in part driven by consistent public
and Ministerial pressure.
The Government’s decision in 2006 to deploy a second medium scale force
to Helmand province in Afghanistan further increased the pressure on Service
Personnel, on elements of the MOD’s welfare, medical and investigative systems,
and on the coronial system.
Much of the MOD’s and the Government’s effort from 2006 was focused on
addressing those pressures.
The MOD should have planned and prepared to address those pressures, rather than
react to them.
The Government should have acted sooner to address the backlog of inquests
into the deaths of Service Personnel. The support it did provide, in June 2006,
cleared the backlog.
The MOD made a number of improvements to the Board of Inquiry process, but
some proposals for more substantive reform (including the introduction of an
independent member) were not fully explored. The MOD significantly improved the
way it communicated with and supported bereaved families in relation to military
investigations and inquests.
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