The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

277. Mr Brown agreed on the same day to increase the ceiling for UORs and that the

MOD should begin to capture NACMO, but said that all such costs should be contained

within the UOR ceiling “until any operation is initiated”.135

278. On 11 December, Mr Rycroft confirmed that Mr Blair was “content that military

preparations from January would become increasingly visible”.136

279. Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Brown on 13 December, warning him that Mr Blair’s decision

on 9 December would increase the rate at which the MOD incurred additional costs.137

280. The recently agreed £150m tranche was “likely to be exhausted by 20 December”.

Mr Hoon requested an additional £200m for UORs, bringing the UOR total to £500m.

281. Mr Paul Boateng, Chief Secretary to the Treasury, agreed the request on

23 December.138

282. The discussions leading up to that decision are set out in greater detail in

Section 13.1 which shows that the arrangement for reclaiming the NACMO worked as

intended and did not constrain the military’s ability to conduct operations against Iraq.

283. There was no delay or obstruction on the part of the Treasury that stifled the

progress of UORs.

284. Mr McKane told the Inquiry that there had been no major obstacles to the

preparations with the Treasury, although the need to return to the Treasury to increase

the tranches of money available had been frustrating to some:

“Inevitably in these kind of circumstances there is an anxiety and a concern on the

part of the Ministry of Defence to get on with things and the – and it did take a month

or so after my first engagement in this for the agreements to be reached to start

to commit money to these Urgent Operational Requirements. But thereafter, the

process operated smoothly. There were some, I think, who were probably frustrated

at the fact that … we were given tranches of money … and I can remember that

we would get quite quickly to the point where we had exhausted the first tranche

and were then involved in the preparation of ministerial correspondence to secure

the release of the next tranche, but I think … that was understandable in the

circumstances.”139

285. Lt Gen Pigott’s UOR update for the Chiefs of Staff on 20 December stated that

79 UORs had been approved at a cost of £283m, 48 from Tranche 1 and 31 from

135 Letter Brown to Hoon, 9 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Urgent Operational Requirements’.

136 Letter Rycroft to Watkins, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Preparations’.

137 Letter Hoon to Brown, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Costs’.

138 Letter Boateng to Hoon, 23 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Costs’.

139 Public hearing, 2 July 2010, pages 35-36.

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