The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• Ms Palacio commented that “Iraqi progress had always been last minute and

under pressure”. In her legal experience, she had “never seen a situation were

[sic] witnesses did not speak freely unless they were threatened”.

• Secretary Powell questioned whether those who advocated reinforced

inspections were serious or afraid to step up to the challenge of Iraq’s lack

of compliance”.109

436. Sir Jeremy commented that Dr Blix’s report was much more equivocal than that

of 27 January. His, and Dr ElBaradei’s, answers in the closed session were:

“… more indicative of their underlying suspicions, as though they knew their

prepared remarks had over-compensated. Tough exchanges with the Americans

the day before may have made Blix more determined to assert his independence.

“We have to go on hammering away at the logic of SCR 1441: it is about Iraq’s

approach, and not the inspections … When the Council middle ground … realise

they have to face up to hard and final decisions, they may take more account

of the responsibility they hold. So far, wishful procrastination continues to rule.”

437. Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that, following his report on 27 January,

Dr Blix had “got a bit cross” with the US because they felt that might in itself amount

to a material breach. As a result, in his report on 14 February, Dr Blix had:

“… within the scope that he felt he had for interpretation … said, ‘They are actually

beginning to cooperate … So I feel I’m getting somewhere.’ The Americans were

quite cross about that …”110

438. Sir Jeremy added that, “in the lunch after”, Dr Blix “was tougher on the Iraqis and

their lack of co-operation in private than he had been in public, and it was clear from my

conversations with him … that … was affected by the reaction of the Americans to what

he had said on 27 January”.

439. Asked if that was because Dr Blix did not want to provide an automatic trigger

for action, Sir Jeremy replied: “Yes”.

440. Asked what Dr Blix had said about pressure from the US or UK, Sir Jeremy replied:

“Hans Blix complained more than once to me about the pressures from the

Americans. … [H]e felt the relationship with the British was much more reasonable

and professional and we weren’t trying to distort the facts for political reasons.

“… I never heard a word of complaint from him about the pressure being put on him

by the British …”111

109 Telegram 266 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix and ElBaradei

Presentations: Private Session’.

110 Public hearing, 27 January 2009, pages 70-71.

111 Private hearing, 26 May 2010, pages 18-19.

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