The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
698.
Despite
mounting evidence of violent insurgency, the UK’s policy of
military
drawdown in
Iraq continued. After force levels had been reviewed in January,
the
rationale
for continued drawdown was based on adjusted criteria by which the
success
of Security
Sector Reform would be judged, meaning that such reform would
be
implemented
“only to applicable standards for Iraq”.244
699.
February 2004
was the worst month for Coalition casualties since the fall
of
Saddam
Hussein’s regime. More than 200 people, mainly Iraqi citizens, were
killed in
suicide
attacks. Attacks on the Iraqi Security Forces were increasing and
concerns about
Islamic
extremists operating in Iraq began to grow. By the end of March,
more than
200 attacks
targeting Iraqi citizens were being reported each
week.
700.
In April,
there was a sudden escalation in attacks by the Jaysh al‑Mahdi
(JAM) in
Basra,
described by the General Officer Commanding MND(SE) as “like a
switch had
been
flicked”.245
In
Fallujah, a US offensive which followed the ambush and murder
of
four
security contractors provoked an angry response from the Sunni
community.
701.
The
significant worsening of security, coupled with revelations of
abuse by members
of the US
military of Iraqi detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison, led many
of the Inquiry’s
witnesses
to conclude that the spring of 2004 had been a turning
point.
702.
At the end of
April, Mr Blair’s analysis was that the key issue in Iraq was
not
multi‑faceted,
rather it was “simple: security”.246
703.
Despite the
failing security situation in MND(SE) in spring 2004,
Gen Walker
was explicit
that no additional troops were required for the tasks currently
assigned
to the
UK.
704.
The Chiefs of
Staff maintained the view they had originally reached in
November
2003, that
HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) should not be actively
considered
for
deployment to Iraq, even though:
•
Iraq was a
higher priority for the UK than Afghanistan;
•
security in
Iraq was clearly worsening and had been identified by
Mr Blair
as the key
issue; and
•
there had
been a specific US request for deployment of HQ ARRC.
244
Minute
Reith to PSO/CDS, 29 January 2004, ‘Op TELIC Force Level Review –
Jan 04’.
245
Public
hearing Lamb, 9 December 2009, pages 67‑68.
246
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: 15 Reports for the Prime
Minister’.
96