The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
447.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Blair said that the security situation in the
cities
had to be
stabilised, particularly for hospitals. Although a violent release
of anger in
response to
the fall of the regime was inevitable, the humanitarian situation
had to be
improved.
The three basics were food, water and healthcare, on which DFID
should
provide
advice on both the current situation and the strategy for the
future. More broadly,
Iraq had
some way to go before the outlook was satisfactory. Meanwhile we
had to
nurture the
beginning of a different attitude towards the post-conflict
situation among the
international
community.
448.
On 12 April,
Gen Jackson told the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq that:
“…
lawlessness was the main problem. The situation in Basra was being
brought
under
control and the British Division intended to start joint
military/[Iraqi] civil police
patrols
within 48 hours. Baghdad was a bigger problem …” 293
449.
Ms Short
reported that UN vehicles had been looted in Baghdad and that the
ICRC
feared the
outbreak of disease. Disorder in Baghdad and elsewhere was
preventing the
return of
UN agencies. Mr Hoon suggested that getting UN agencies and
others back to
work in the
South would enable the British to set an example of how to restore
normality.
This would
create a virtuous circle which could progressively be replicated
by the
Americans
further north.
450.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Blair said that disorder in Iraq was the main
issue.
It was
important to stabilise the situation in Iraq before engaging on the
UN track and
the establishment
of an Iraqi interim authority.
451.
HQ 1 (UK) Div
moved to Basra Airport on 13 April.294
452.
1 (UK) Div
continued to advance north of Basra, into Maysan
province.295
453.
Joint UK
patrols with Iraqi police officers commenced in Basra on 13 April
(see
Section
9.1).296
Local
populations set up their own security arrangements in some
other
towns in
the UK AO.
454.
16 Air Assault
Brigade secured the air field at al-Amara on 13
April.297
The
situation
in al-Amara
was described as “stable”, with looting having
ceased.298
The local
police
had
“disbanded and disappeared” about a week earlier, leaving “rather
ad hoc” security
arrangements.
293
Minutes, 12
April 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
294
Minute
Thomas to Manning, 13 April 2003, ‘Iraq: COBR Round Up of Key
Events – 13 April 2003’.
295
Briefing
[MOD], 13 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As
at 1100 13 April 2003’.
296
Ministry of
Defence, Operations
in Iraq Lessons for the Future, December
2003; Note MOD, [undated],
‘MOD Note
on Policing Situation’.
297
Briefing
[MOD], 13 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – As
at 1100 13 April 2003’.
298
Note MOD,
[undated], ‘MOD Note on Policing Situation’.
82