10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
132.
The Government
initially adopted a low‑key approach to lobbying for UK
business,
to avoid
giving “undue prominence” to commercial interests.40
From March
2003, in
response to
pressure from UK companies, it gradually stepped up its
efforts.
133.
The US
(including USAID, the US Army Corps of Engineers and the CPA)
was
the major
source of reconstruction contracts during the Occupation. The
Government’s
objective
was to ensure a “level playing field” for UK
companies.41
The US
made
clear to
the UK that, while it welcomed the participation of UK companies,
there was
no “special
deal”.
134.
A senior UK
Trade and Investment (UKTI) official, writing in December
2003,
reported
that:
“It took
time, initially, to persuade Ministers that this [promoting UK
business] was a
legitimate
objective that the Government should be seen to be promoting
actively …
“But the
departments responsible for overseeing this co‑ordination [on
post‑conflict
Iraq] made
clear at an early stage that UK commercial interests were a lower
priority
than other
aspects of reconstruction. The result … was that the contribution
that the
private
sector could make to post‑conflict reconstruction was less well
registered.”42
135.
The Government
began a review of the UK’s approach to post‑conflict
reconstruction
in September 2003.
136.
The
inter‑departmental Post‑Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was
established
in
September 2004. It became operational during 2005 and in December
2007 was
renamed the
Stabilisation Unit (SU).
137.
The PCRU and
SU focused their activity on Afghanistan. They made limited,
but
valuable,
contributions in Iraq.
138.
Since 2007,
the SU has continued to evolve in response to a changing
strategic
and policy
framework shaped by:
•
the 2008
and 2010 National Security Strategies (NSS);
•
the 2010
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR); and
•
the 2011
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS).
40
Minute
Henderson to Symons, 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Post‑Conflict
Commercial Issues’.
41
Letter
Zimmer to Rycroft, 10 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial
Issues’ attaching Paper UKTI,
10 October
2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial Issues’.
42
Minute
Warren to Haddrill, 10 December 2003, ‘Post‑Conflict Resolution:
Iraq’.
549