The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We will
consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: if Saddam Hussein
does not
fully
disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the
world, we will lead
a coalition
to disarm him.”
742.
President Bush
also announced that the US would ask the UN Security
Council
to convene
on 5 February to “consider the facts of Iraq’s ongoing defiance”;
and that
Secretary
Powell would “present information and intelligence about Iraq’s …
illegal
weapons
programs, its attempt to hide those weapons from inspectors, and
its links
to terrorist
groups”.
743.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock continued to advise that there was little
support
in the
Security Council for a second resolution.
744.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that only four countries definitely supported
a
second
resolution and that:
“Things
will not move in our direction without some fact or development to
give
countries
the grounds on which to change position, or at least give us more
time
to …
confirm the conclusion that Iraq will not
co‑operate.”250
745.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Security Council on 29 January that
Iraq
was in
material breach of resolution 1441 and the Council could not
“simply tread
water”. It
would have to “take tough decisions soon”.
746.
On 29 January,
the Security Council met for a second time to discuss the
reports
delivered
by Dr Blix and Dr Elbaradei on 27
January.251
747.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that the discussion was “a replay of
earlier
positions”,
and that “Almost every delegation” had welcomed Secretary
Powell’s
intention
to “provide evidence” on 5 February. Most delegations saw the
presentation as
“feeding in
to the inspections process”.
748.
Sir Jeremy
told the Council that, in asking for more time, there was a need
to
be
realistic: “Time would not achieve anything without the
co‑operation we expected.”
Iraq had:
not given “access to its illegal WMD programmes”; “allowed
omissions in the
declaration”;
and “failed to co‑operate”. “The inescapable conclusion was Iraq
was in
material
breach of [resolution] 1441.”
250
Telegram
161 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Which Way
Will the Votes
Stack
Up?’
251
Telegram
167 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: 29
January Security
Council Discussion’.
134