The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

202. Gen Walker’s Private Office replied on 19 September to the request from Dr Reid’s

Private Office for an assurance that the MOD’s planning assumptions for deployment in

Afghanistan – as presented to DOP in July 2005 – would be achievable in the event of a

slower than expected drawdown of UK forces in Iraq.104 The minute said:

“The short answer is yes … CJO [Chief of Joint Operations] … is clear that our plans

for Afghanistan are deliverable even if events slow down our Iraq disengagement;

furthermore, DCDS(C) [Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)] has

factored the possibility of such a slippage into the MOD’s strategic planning for

Afghanistan and our strategic intent for future commitments.”

203. Such a situation would lead to “some pain-and-grief”, in particular the pressure on

already stretched services such as helicopter support would continue:

“But, our ability to fulfil our plan in Afghanistan is not predicated on withdrawal

of such capabilities from Iraq and … in the event that our … plan for progressive

disengagement from southern Iraq is delayed, we will still be able to deliver our …

mandated force levels in Afghanistan.”

204. Dr Reid told the Inquiry that he had asked for this assurance from General Walker

because he was:

“… slightly worried that although there was a chronological coincidence with the

downturn in Iraq, the downsizing of forces and the going into Helmand, I did not

want one to be reliant upon the other, in case we couldn’t get out of Iraq.”105

205. Gen Walker’s assurance had met his concern:

“… there wasn’t a concern in my mind that this [going into Helmand] would result in

a diminution of our resources in Iraq, personnel or otherwise. Why? Because I had

asked that specific question and been told, ‘No’.”106

206. Sir Kevin Tebbit, MOD Permanent Under Secretary from 1998 to 2005, told

the Inquiry:

“I was apprehensive [about the deployment of UK forces to Helmand] and I made

my concerns known to my planning staff and to the Chiefs of Staff. I think their

view was that they could do it and it was manageable … since it was [the Chiefs

of Staff] who would actually have to ensure they could do this, I did not press

my objections fully.”107

207. Dr Reid told the Inquiry that Sir Kevin had not shared his concerns on this issue

with him.108

104 Minute PSO to APS2/SoS, 19 September 2005, ‘Iraq/Afghanistan Commitments’.

105 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, page 58.

106 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, page 63.

107 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 15-16.

108 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 61-62.

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