4.4 | The
search for WMD
discussed
the arrangements for units in the Cabinet Office and the FCO to
co-ordinate
the
responses to, respectively, the ISC and FAC.
312.
On
6 June, Mr Howard informed members of the Evidence and
Elimination Task
Force that,
as a result of the “intense media and parliamentary interest in
Iraqi WMD
and related
UK dossiers”, there would be “a shift of gear” in the intensity of
Task Force
activity
and its role.154
313.
The Task Force
“Mark 2” would focus on supporting the ISG’s WMD work
and
continuing
to improve information flows between London, Washington and
theatre,
while the
new JIC Group focused on the inquiries to be conducted by the FAC
and
ISC.
Reflecting the establishment of the ISG, the Task Force would
become more
intelligence-led,
providing “guidance, ideas and information to the ISG for
exploitation”.
Task Force
membership would need to reflect those changes. The UK would
be
increasing
its capabilities on the ground to feed in to the ISG’s
work.
314.
Mr Howard
circulated Terms of Reference for the Task Force on
18 June.155
Its five
functions were:
“•
To
contribute to US/UK/AUS strategic guidance on the conduct of the
search for
Iraqi WMD
through the Iraq Survey Group and other agencies.
•
To monitor,
report and consider public handling of significant WMD
related
discoveries.
•
To
co-ordinate the UK contribution to the ISG and other bodies
associated with
the search
for Iraqi WMD.
•
To consider
longer term issues associated with Iraqi WMD including
destruction
and
counter-proliferation.
•
To provide
advice and reports as required to Ministers and other
senior
management
in MOD and elsewhere in Whitehall as appropriate.”
315.
Sir John
Scarlett told the Inquiry:
“The actual
day-to-day conduct of business with the ISG was conducted
by
something
called the Executive Group [the WMD Task Force], which was
overseen
by the
Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence [DCDI, Mr Howard]. So it
was … more
on the
DIS/MOD side, and that was where the direction of the British
contribution to
the ISG and
personnel was directed from.
“But the
JIC sort of overall, I as Chairman of the JIC, and I, in
particular, as Chairman
of the JIC
sub-group on Iraq WMD … had that as part of our specific remit,
that we
needed to
oversee the relationship with the ISG. So I was either in direct
contact
myself with
David Kay [the first Head of the ISG], for the rest of 2003, and
then
154
Minutes,
6 June 2003, WMD Evidence and Elimination Task Force
meeting.
155
Minute
Howard to DCPAC, 18 June 2003, ‘Iraq: WMD Task Force’
attaching Paper [unattributed],
[undated],
‘WMD Task Force ToR’.
485