10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
way on
humanitarian issues”.77
Although
reconstruction had not been explicitly
mentioned,
the EU had undertaken to contribute to a “post-Saddam Iraq”, and
had
directed
the Commission and Council Secretariat to start planning for that.
The UK
needed to
build on this in order to “start to heal EU divisions”, and make
progress on
post-conflict
resolutions.
106.
On 26 March,
during the early stages of discussion in between the UK and
US
delegations
in New York on the text of what was to become resolution 1483
(see
Section
9.1), Sir Paul Lever, British Ambassador to Germany, raised
concerns with
Mr Peter
Ricketts, FCO Political Director, about the UK’s failure to engage
EU allies
from the
outset.78
Sir Paul
recalled that Mr Blair had stated in the House of
Commons
on
18 March, that, with the wisdom of hindsight, it would have
been best if Europe had
adopted a
common position on Iraq, including with respect to the use of force
provided
the US
acted through the UN and engaged seriously on Israel/Palestine. Sir
Paul
commented
that Mr Blair’s advice had not been followed on
reconstruction:
“… I hope
that you [Mr Ricketts] and others will, before we get
inextricably locked in
to a common
UK/US bilateral position on post-conflict Iraq, have the
opportunity to
consider
whether, after our experience over the last six months, this is
really where
we want to
be.”
107.
Mr Ricketts
relayed those views, together with those of Sir John
Holmes
(British Ambassador
to France) and Sir Roderic Lyne (British Ambassador to
the
Russian
Federation), to Mr Simon McDonald, Mr Straw’s Principal
Private Secretary.79
Mr Ricketts
reported that a meeting of FCO officials earlier that day had
agreed
that it made
sense to engage with European countries at the formative stage of
the
resolution,
“both because we needed their support to get it through the
Security
Council, and
because it was potentially an important part of re-establishing a
good
working
relationship”.
108.
On 27 March,
Sir John Holmes added:
“… the
bottom line is that we will need French (and German) support if a
UN
resolution
is to pass. We are more likely to get it if we share our thinking
with
them at an
early stage. They see the need, as we do, to save the Americans
(or
at least
the Pentagon) from too much of a military administration which
could go
109.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, the UK Permanent Representative to the UN,
confirmed
to
Mr Ricketts that he was “entirely alive to the opportunity of
getting the Europeans and
77
Telegram
367 UKRep Brussels to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase IV:
EU Handling’.
78
Letter
Lever to Ricketts, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction: How to
Influence the Americans’.
79
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq
Reconstruction Resolution: Working
the
Europeans”.
80
Letter
Holmes to Ricketts, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction: Working
the Europeans’.
21