The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
42.
The first was
a document of almost 500 pages, “designed to provide a
comprehensive
reference and briefing document” for use by government
departments,
providing
details of:
•
Iraq’s
nuclear, chemical and biological programmes and their potential
means
of delivery,
particularly ballistic missiles;
•
procurement
mechanisms in recent times;
•
the
critical goods which Iraq would require for WMD-related
programmes;
•
goods and
technologies which Iraq was actively seeking;
•
developments
in indigenous military production; and
•
Iraq’s
conventional arms purchases.18
43.
The document
replaced a version produced in 1996.
44.
A one-page
summary of key judgements was provided, including:
•
The
location and condition of the concealed Al Hussein missiles was
“unknown”,
but there
was “sufficient engineering expertise to make them
operational”.
•
Iraq had
“begun development” of ballistic missiles with a range of more
than
1,000km,
but it would “not be able to produce such a missile before
2007
provided
sanctions remain effective”.
•
Iraq was
“continuing to carry out research into nuclear weapons
development
at a
theoretical level” and intelligence indicated that it might have
recalled its
nuclear
scientists from civilian work in 1998.
•
Iraq might
“be trying to develop centrifuge enrichment of uranium”, but that
was
“likely to
produce significant, if not insurmountable problems”.
•
“Some
clandestine procurement has been attempted abroad using
foreign
front
companies. Many ‘dual-use’ items such as machine tools and
electrical
equipment
have been acquired which would be available for the
nuclear
programme.”
•
It was
assessed that Iraq had “no intention of restoring its CW agent
production
to pre-Gulf
Conflict levels” but it “could begin the production of mustard gas
on
a significant
scale at any time and the nerve agents sarin and VX within
weeks”.
•
It was
assessed that Iraq was “continuing to conceal the full extent of
its BW
programme
in order to preserve a limited offensive capability and that it
could
revive its
BW programme within a matter of weeks without much difficulty
or
outside
assistance”.
•
Iraq’s CBW
production capability had “been dispersed to survive a military
attack
and UN
inspections”.
18
Paper
Defence Intelligence Analysis Staff, August 2002, ‘Proliferation
Study: Iraq’.
122