The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
York during
the following week. It extended the MNF-I’s mandate for a further
year, but
the letters
also acknowledged the Government of Iraq’s wish that this should be
the last
resolution
of its kind. The letters committed the US and Iraqis to negotiating
a long-term
agreement
to cover the presence of US forces in Iraq in 2009 and beyond. The
UK had
yet to
decide whether to pursue something similar.
674.
During the
visit, Mr Brown spoke by telephone to Prime Minister Maliki
and
congratulated
him on the decision to move to PIC in Basra.312
Mr Brown
promised
that the UK
“would continue to act sensitively in Basra” and that
Mr Alexander
and Mr Miliband
would both visit soon, the former for the launch of the
Basra
Development
Forum.
675.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported on 10 December that it had been a “further steady week”
in
security
terms, with no major incidents in Anbar, Baghdad or the
South.313
There
were
some
“interesting dynamics” in the South, with “Maliki’s Iraqi led
operations” in Karbala
and
Diwaniyah, together with “rumours of a major offensive in Basra”.
They were “having
an effect
on JAM” but the freeze was holding. In Basra, “despite much talk of
defensive
preparation,
JAM, backed up by OMS from Najaf, have come to the table and appear
to
be willing
to sign up to some if not all of Mohan’s demands”.
676.
At the local
political level, Lt Gen Rollo reported that Governor Waili
was
“reconciled
to Maliki”. Lt Gen Rollo considered that this cleared the way for
the Basra
Development
Forum meeting on 12 December and for transition to PIC on 16
December.
It also
meant that the way was clear to:
“… focus
hard on how the promises to be made at the Forum will be kept
…
General Petraeus’s
challenge, reiterated to each UK visitor, to fulfil our
Prime
Minister’s
intent has been very clear. Barham Saleh underlined this point when
he
spoke to
the MOD and FCO Permanent Secretaries who visited this week
along
with the
DFID Director covering the Middle East. He said that while long
term
capacity
building remained essential, ‘jump starting’ was now necessary …
That
should give
us our lead. The way that money has been poured into Anbar, by
both
the US and
the GOI, to reinforce success is also setting the standard;
recognising
that in
counter-insurgency operations, all the lines of operation must be
properly
supported.”
677.
Mr Brown
reported on his visit to Iraq at Cabinet on 11
December.314
He said
that
British
troops would be transferring responsibility for the security of
Basra to PIC on
16 December
as planned. The number of violent incidents targeted at British
forces
had reduced
by 90 percent since September, and they were already operating in
an
overwatch
capacity in support of the Iraqi Security Forces: “Their main role
would be
312
Letter
Fletcher to Gooding, 9 December 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone
Call with Prime Minister of
Iraq, 9
December’.
313
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 10 December 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (280) 9 Dec
07’.
314
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 December 2007.
306