The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1051.
The
“’residual’ CPA team” would become the Project Continuity Team
(PCT).
Their work
is described later in this Section.
1052.
The ISOG
judged that the paper offered a “satisfactory account”, but asked
DFID
to liaise
with Mr Nixon to ensure his concerns had been fully
answered.614
1053.
On 18 May, Sir
Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note from Mr Blair for
President
Bush, in
advance of their regular video conference two days
later.615
1054.
Mr Blair
wrote that the coming few weeks were the last chance to move
things
into place
before the new Iraqi Government took power, and proposed a
timetable for
the
political process. He also proposed:
•
better
protection of oil and power installations; and
•
more help
for Al Iraqiya and high-quality media support for the new
Iraqi
Prime
Minister.
1055.
In their video
conference on 20 May, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed
the
timetable
for and sequence of events surrounding the transfer of
sovereignty.616
1056.
Mr Blair
was advised on 21 May that US and UK officials had met to
discuss
communications
issues surrounding the transition.617
The CPA was
establishing a
communications
office for the incoming Iraqi Prime Minister. Staffing that office
might be
problematic;
the incoming Prime Minister would probably not accept staff
nominated by
the US or
UK but might have few of his own.
1057.
Mr Richmond
reported from Baghdad on the same day that the CPA was
working
“intensively”
to establish the new administrative arrangements that the incoming
Iraqi
Prime
Minister would need:
“Iraq no
longer has anything we would recognise as a functioning centre
of
government;
these structures require setting up from scratch.
“The
straitjacket of a CPA Order has been rejected in favour of
presenting an outline
proposal to
an incoming Prime Minister, allowing strong Iraqi ownership of
all
structures
and staffing, though [Ambassador] Bremer has directed that some
core
staff be in
place from the day the [Prime Minister] is appointed. It will be
made clear
that this
is advice, not prescription.”618
614
Minutes, 18
May 2004, Iraq Senior Officials Group.
615
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 18 May 2004, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note
on
Iraq’.
616
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 20 May 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 20
May: Iraq’.
617
Minute
Heatly to Prime Minister, 21 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Communications Around
the Transition’.
618
Telegram
250 IraqRep to FCO London, 21 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Support to the New
Prime Minister’.
182