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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
57.  Iraq informed the Security Council of its decision to comply with the resolution
“without conditions” in a letter from Mr Naji Sabri, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, to
Mr Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, on 13 November 2002.18
58.  The key points in the letter in relation to WMD were:
The claims by President Bush and Mr Blair that “Iraq might have produced, or
might have been on the way to producing, nuclear weapons” since 1998 and
that “Iraq had indeed produced chemical and biological weapons” was “an utterly
unfounded fabrication” and “baseless”.
Iraq had agreed to the return of inspectors, and had “already stated” that it had
“neither produced nor possessed any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of
mass destruction during the absence of the inspectors”.
59.  The letter challenged a statement made by Sir Jeremy Greenstock that Iraq had
been provided with the opportunity to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction, but
Iraq had ignored that opportunity and decided to keep possession. The letter asked why
“none of the representatives” of the members of the Security Council had “asked …
when, how or where such an alleged decision had been taken by Iraq to keep weapons
of mass destruction”.
60.  The UK remained sceptical about Iraq’s intentions, focusing on its track
record of deceit, and repeating the need to maintain the threat of military action to
secure compliance.
61.  In a lecture that evening, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, welcomed Iraq’s
response “so far as it goes” but added:
“… we must remain vigilant for experience with Iraq tells us to temper optimism with
scepticism and to read the small print. Iraq’s intentions are notoriously changeable.
What matters above all is their actions not their words.
“… The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq is littered with examples of deceit,
evasion, intimidation and harassment. I hope even Iraq will recognise the
consequences of any repeat. If Saddam fails to co-operate fully, then he faces force.”19
18  UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated 13 November 2002 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq
addressed to the Secretary-General’ (S/2002/1242).
19  The National Archives, 13 November 2002, The Future of Foreign Policy.
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