The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
515.
Mr Powell told
the Inquiry:
“I actually
put a note to the Prime Minister setting out what I thought we
should focus
on … This
is not Kosovo. This is not Afghanistan. If you are thinking about
Iraq, you
have to
think about it in a different way. You have to be able to put it in
a political
context. I
referred … to the Chicago speech … You need to think about the
long
term, about
the Middle East peace process … and how you’d put Saddam in a
…
proper
framework to consider this sort of action.” 188
516.
Mr Powell
emphasised that he was not providing Mr Blair with options in his
note
on 28
March, and others had also given Mr Blair their views. His role was
to help Mr
Blair to
focus before the meeting.
517.
Mr Powell
added that he was:
“… talking
about how we could influence the Americans … we were trying
to
replicate
what we had done after 9/11 on Afghanistan. We were trying to say
to
them,
‘Don’t rush into anything. Move at a deliberative pace and, above
all, build
a
coalition. Talk to people, go the UN route. Don’t rush into
unilateral action.’ We
believed
unilateral action would have been a terrible thing by America, and
we
wanted to
try and put it in a much wider political context.” 189
518.
Mr Powell said
that Mr Blair was:
“… always
clear that the world would be better off without Saddam Hussein …
from
the very
beginning … he thought the best way to pursue this, as with
Afghanistan,
would be to
go down the UN route and give Saddam every chance to comply,
but,
if he
didn’t, to build a coalition to deal with him.”190
519.
Sir
Christopher Meyer advised on 1 April that President Bush had
raised
expectations
that the US would take military action against Iraq but
questions
were
beginning to be asked about the risks.
520.
Sir
Christopher also warned about the implications of the US
approach
to nation
building in Afghanistan.
521.
In a telegram
describing President Bush as “riding high” on his definition of
himself
as
“Commander in Chief of the war on terrorism” which had transformed
his Presidency,
Sir
Christopher Meyer advised that President Bush needed
to:
“… show if
not victory, at least momentum, and he has raised expectations that
this
means
taking the war to Iraq. Until recently, the overwhelming tide of
opinion inside
188
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 19-20.
189
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 22-23.
190
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 30-31.
480