The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
337.
The Iraqi
Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a “detailed rebuttal” on 2
October,
which
described the UK dossier as “a series of lies and empty propaganda”
which was
“totally
inconsistent” with the facts and reports made by UNSCOM and the
International
Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).114
338.
The rebuttal
emphasised Iraq’s “intensive efforts” and co‑operation between
1991
and 1998 in
implementing resolution 687 (1991) and other resolutions. It also
stated that
Iraq had
not imported any prohibited material.
339.
Detailed
comments on Iraq’s rebuttal are set out in Section
4.3.
340.
Mr Julian
Miller, Chief of the Assessments Staff, told Sir David Manning that
a
review of
the rebuttal conducted by the Assessments Staff, the intelligence
agencies
and the FCO
dismissed it as: “In broad terms … very weak; long on rhetoric and
short
on detail.”
It did not undermine the UK dossier and in a number of key areas
failed to
provide a
credible response.
341.
Mr Miller
added that the document presented “a somewhat rosy picture” of
Iraq’s
relationship
with UNSCOM. He characterised Iraq’s refutation of the UK “claim
that its
WMD
programmes have continued post 1998” as an “attitude of
denial”.
342.
Under the
heading “Iraq: Still Playing Games”, press lines prepared by
the
Communications
and Information Centre (CIC) focused on:
•
Iraq’s
pre‑1998 co‑operation with UNSCOM and its failures:
{{to
provide full and comprehensive disclosures;
{{to allow
the inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted
access
to relevant
sites, documents and persons; and
•
material
for which UNSCOM had been unable account.
343.
Mr Miller
concluded: “I do not think we need to offer a fuller reply to
any
of Iraq’s claims.”
344.
Iraq’s
explicit denials of possession of prohibited weapons, materials
and
programmes
were not addressed, and there was no consideration of the risk
which
Iraq would
have faced by issuing a detailed rebuttal which inspections might
show
to be untrue.
114
Minute
Miller to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘The Dossier: Iraq’s
Response’ attaching
Email FCO [junior
official]
to Hamill, 3 October 2002, ‘Iraq’s reply on Blair’s Report’ and
Paper [CIC], [undated], ‘Iraq – Still
Playing
Games!’.
260