The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
afford to
get this right – particularly if the US [think] Saddam will rapidly
collapse when
the blow
comes.”
550.
As promised
by Mr Blair on 19 December 2002, Cabinet discussed
Iraq
on 16 January
2003.
551.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet that the strategy remained to pursue the United
Nations
course. The
inspectors needed time to achieve results. If Iraq was not
complying
with the
demands of the UN, a second resolution would be
agreed.
552.
Mr Straw
stated that there was a good prospect of achieving a
second
resolution.
While sticking to the UN route, the UK should not rule out
the
possibility
of military action without a second resolution. Mr Blair
repeated the
latter
statement in his concluding remarks.
553.
At Cabinet on
16 January, Mr Blair said that:
“… he
wanted to make the United Nations route work. The inspectors were
doing
their job
inside Iraq and he was optimistic that they would discover weapons
of
mass
destruction and their associated programmes which had been
concealed.
They needed
time to achieve results, including from better co‑ordinated
intelligence.
If Iraq was
not complying with the demands of the United Nations, he believed
the …
Security
Council would pass a second resolution.”186
554.
Mr Blair
told his colleagues that evidence from the inspectors would make a
veto of
a second
resolution, by other Permanent Members of the Security Council,
“less likely”:
“Meanwhile,
British and American forces were being built up in the Gulf. If it
came
to
conflict, it would be important for success to be achieved quickly.
The [military]
build up
was having an effect on the Iraqi regime, with internal support
dwindling for
President
Saddam Hussein …”
555.
Mr Blair
concluded by telling Cabinet that:
“The
strategy remained to pursue the United Nations course. He would be
meeting
President
Bush to discuss Iraq at the end of the month, after Dr Blix
had reported
to the
Security Council on 27 January.”
“… he was
aware of anxieties about the possibility of having to diverge from
the
United
Nations path. There was a good prospect of achieving a second
resolution.
Many had
been doubtful about achieving the first resolution; in the event,
the …
Security
Council vote had been unanimous. While sticking with the United
Nations
186
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 January 2003.
98