3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
“The two
options are running start and generated start.
“The first
has the advantage of surprise; the second of overwhelming
force.
My military
tell me the risks of heavy losses on the running start make it very
risky.
Apparently
it involves around 15-20,000 troops striking inside Iraq, with
heavy air
support.
The idea would be to catch the regime off balance, strike hard and
quickly
and get it
to collapse. The obvious danger is [that] it doesn’t collapse. And
there is
the risk of
CW being used.
“For that
reason, a generated start seems better. It could always be
translated into
a more
immediate option, should Saddam do something stupid. Also, the
build-up of
forces in
such numbers will be a big signal of serious intent to the region
and help to
pull people
towards us and demoralise the Iraqis. This option allows us to
hammer
his air
defences and infrastructure; to invade from the South and take the
oilfields;
to secure
the North and protect/stabilise the Kurds. Then effectively with
huge force
we go on to
Baghdad.”
“We would
support in any way we can.
“On timing,
we could start building up after the break. A strike date could be
Jan/Feb
next year.
But the crucial issue is not when, but how.”
435.
Mr Powell
told the Inquiry that Mr Blair was seeking a partnership
with
President
Bush and seeking to persuade him to move in a particular
direction
by providing
a framework for action.
436.
Mr Powell told
the Inquiry that the Note was “a very important one … trying
to
make it
clear the basis on which we thought it would be sensible to go
ahead”, and the
basis on
which the US should go to the UN. Mr Blair was “talking about … the
danger
of unintended
consequences”.163
437.
Addressing
what was meant by the reference to unintended
consequences,
Mr Powell
stated that the Iraqis would “feel ambivalent about being invaded.
If we
win quickly
everyone will be our friend. If we don’t, and they haven’t been
bound in
beforehand,
the recriminations will start fast.” Mr Blair was “arguing to put
this [action
against
Iraq] in a political context and to do it in a way that would win
support of a wide
coalition
as with Afghanistan”.
438.
Asked if Mr
Blair was trying to offer Britain’s support in return for influence
over
the means
for taking action, Mr Powell replied:
“Obviously,
there is a trade-off between convincing someone that you are with
them,
that you
believe what they are trying to do and you are going to try to help
them and
163
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 38-39.
75