3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –

the negotiation of resolution 1441

“This fact has also been supported by the information dispatched by the CIA to the

US Congress.

“We do have apprehensions that such weapons might exist on the territory of Iraq

and this is precisely why we want to see to it that United Nations inspectors should

travel there.”

421.  France remained opposed to a resolution which permitted military action

without an explicit decision by the Security Council.

422.  On 5 October, Mr Straw and Mr Blair discussed the need to induce France to

move.147 Mr Blair said that he would speak to President Chirac after President Bush

had done so.

423.  Following discussions between Sir David Manning and Dr Rice,148 and his own

discussions with Secretary Powell and Mr de Villepin, Mr Straw told Mr de Villepin in

a meeting in Paris on 7 October that he had listened to two telephone conversations

between Mr Blair and President Bush in which the President had said he wanted to solve

the problem peacefully.149 Mr Straw said he “believed him [President Bush]”. Mr Straw

encouraged Mr de Villepin to get President Chirac to talk to President Bush.

424.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported on 7 October that:

“… under the pressure of the unmistakeable determination of Washington to resort

to force unless Saddam throws in the towel completely, is the growing focus

amongst other members of the Council, not on avoiding war, but on preserving the

authority of the UN. It is therefore quite possible that a large majority in the Council

would go along with a package which (a) adopted a first resolution which did not

(not) specifically prefigure a second one to authorise force; and (b) gave the Council

a chance to pass an authorising resolution even if the Americans were going to

go ahead anyway.

“… This could be done by drafting the two resolutions at the same time …”150

425.  Sir Jeremy offered some suggestions.

426.  In a conversation on 9 October, Sir David Manning told Mr de La Sablière:

“… we did not envisage taking military action if there were one isolated act of

stupidity. The test would be whether there was a pattern of obstruction or deceit …

Washington realised that the Council would need to review the position and decide

147 Minute Manning to Wechsberg and Rycroft, 6 October 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with

Foreign Secretary on 5 October’.

148 Letter Manning to McDonald, 8 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.

149 Telegram 254 Cairo to FCO London, 8 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Meeting with French

Foreign Minister, Paris 7 October’.

150 Telegram 1924 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Council

Resolution(s)’.

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