9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
in their
security development, and Op SINBAD represented an earlier
equivalent surge
in the
South.
374.
The structural
proposal set out in Maj Gen Shirreff’s 29 December letter
to
Mr Blair was
also discussed at the Iraq Strategy Group, where VAdm Style made
clear
that Maj
Gen Shirreff’s views were not held by the MOD
corporately.
375.
Although
better co‑ordination and control were needed, a new organisation
need
not
necessarily be military‑led. Sir Nigel Sheinwald told the Group
that Iraq was “entering
a new
phase, which required a coherent structure under a single point of
contact” and
asked the
Iraq Senior Officials Group to work on new structures.
376.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald reported to Mr Blair after the meeting that Maj Gen
Shirreff’s
views:
“…
represent his frustration, shared by the MOD, that the civilian
reconstruction
effort is
uneven. We all agree that we need to make sure that we have an
effectively
led Basra
operation for the next year (at least).”208
377.
Sir Nigel
reported that co‑location of everyone at Basra Air Station, from
late
February
onwards, would “help enormously” and that he had asked for advice
on the
right
structure, though the view was that “it should be civilian led,
with strong military
input and
follow‑up”. Sir Nigel had added that both DFID and the FCO
were:
“… very fed
up with Shirreff’s disparaging comments about the civilian effort
…
But the
fact is that there have been constant problems between the military
and
civilian
people in Basra from the start. We must make a last effort to get a
joined‑up
operation.”
378.
Mr Blair
annotated Sir Nigel’s minute: “Put Shirreff in charge – the Army
gets things
379.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald also provided Mr Blair with an update on Iraq in
which he
considered
the expected announcement of a surge of US forces into
Iraq.210
The
key
issue for
the UK was the potential impact on the UK’s planned strategy for
Basra.
Sir Nigel
wrote:
“The MOD
are putting a positive gloss on Operation SINBAD because they
are
desperate
to get down to 4,500 by May/June for Afghan reasons. I asked them
at my
Whitehall
Strategy Group meeting today to be clearer about the
conditions
which
would need
to be met for security transition to take place. This is a mixture
of the
208
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly Update’
attaching Note Cabinet
Office, 5
January 2007, ‘Basra’.
209
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq:
Weekly
Update’
attaching Note Cabinet Office, 5 January 2007,
‘Basra’.
210
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly Update’
attaching Note Cabinet
Office, 5
January 2007, ‘Basra’ including manuscript comments
Blair.
71