9.3  |  July 2004 to May 2005

“A Shia insurgency, small at present, will persist. Its scope and scale will depend

on the degree of political inclusion (particularly as regards al-Sadr) and the success

of economic improvements in poor Shia areas, and could be affected by how the

Sunnis react to the election results.”

282.  In Baghdad, the JIC judged that:

“With a deal struck between representatives of al-Sadr and the IIG, violence in

the Sadr City area of Baghdad has reduced significantly. Isolated attacks, mainly

against the MNF, have continued in Baghdad and elsewhere in Shia areas. Most

are conducted by renegade Mahdi Army elements determined to continue to attack

the MNF, but other Shia groups are also involved. Intelligence continues to indicate

confusion and dissention among the Mahdi Army and al-Sadr’s supporters.”

283.  For Sunni groups, the JIC assessed that the next few months would be:

“… important in shaping the scale of their insurgency. There are signs that some

of the insurgents may be susceptible to overtures from the IIG. Prime Minister

Allawi and other senior figures in the government have invested considerable effort

in establishing dialogue with a variety of Sunni insurgent leaders … In the short

term much may depend on Fallujah. Long drawn out fighting with heavy civilian

casualties will reinforce the broader Sunni Arab insurgency and may jeopardise

attempts to bring Sunni Arabs into the political process. Success in Fallujah, either

through negotiations or a successful military operation – particularly against foreign

jihadists – will result in the IIG maintaining momentum and offers the prospect

of further progress after the elections. But, whatever the outcome in Fallujah a

significant Sunni Arab insurgency will continue through 2005 and beyond. The

election will bear on its scale. An acceptable outcome for the Sunnis could lead

to a reduction in violence. A result which deepens their political exclusion may see

a continuation of the current level or perhaps an increase.”146

284.  The JIC assessed that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s position might be strengthened

by his pledge of allegiance to Usama Bin Laden, enabling him to attract more foreign

recruits and funding, and making his group a long term threat. But the AQ “brand” was

expected to reinforce further the fears of Iraqi citizens opposed to the jihadist agenda.

285.  On 27 October, Maj Gen Farquhar reported that “the Independent Electoral

Commission of Iraq (IECI) had formally requested logistic support in the distribution

of electoral registration papers.”147

286.  A report from Maj Gen Rollo in MND (SE) on the same date suggested that the

prospect of elections was having a “positive effect” although the timetable remained

146  JIC Assessment, 27 October 2004, ‘Iraq: A Long-Term Insurgency Problem’.

147  Report Farquhar, 27 October 2004, ‘MNC-I Security Update – 27 Oct 04’.

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