The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
287.
The other
Basra militia were aware of the negotiations and remained
suspicious
that the
deal would marginalise them. JAM1 had given an undertaking that JAM
would
respect the
Iraqi Government’s takeover of Basra Palace and would not loot it,
provided
that there
was an effective guard force in place.
288.
The senior
official concluded:
“This
initiative has already delivered significant results but the
negotiations remain
fragile,
uncertain and vulnerable to outside interference. This applies
especially to
[JAM1’s]
undertaking on Basra Palace. General Muhan’s Palace Protection
Force
will be the
main guarantor of a smooth handover.”
289.
The national
JAM cease-fire was welcomed by the Iraqi Ministerial Committee
on
National
Security meeting at the start of September.136
Prime
Minister Maliki agreed that
it provided
an opportunity to:
•
support
moderate Sadrists, isolating the criminal and terrorist
elements;
•
encourage
Sadrists to engage in the political process;
•
begin talks
with the religious authorities in Sadrist areas;
•
outlaw all
non-ISF armed groups;
•
cease the
raids into Sadrist areas as a confidence-building measure,
which
would also
help restore calm;
•
release a
number of arrested JAM members as a goodwill gesture;
•
provide
work for the young non-criminal elements of JAM; and
to
•
invest
financially in the JAM areas to help with provision of
services.
290.
Asked on
the Today
Programme on 3 September
whether the withdrawal from
Basra
Palace signalled that the UK was pulling out of Iraq, Mr Brown
said that this
was a
“pre-planned and … organised move” and that the UK would “discharge
all our
responsibilities
to the Iraqi people”.137
The UK was
moving from a combat role towards
overwatch
and retained the ability to reintervene if required. Mr Brown
denied the
accusation
that Basra was being left to the mercy of the militias, pointing
out that there
were 30,000
Iraqi Security Forces (army and police) in Basra who would
maintain
security
there.
291.
On 3
September, government officials working closely with the military
met JAM1,
who was
“even crosser than we expected” about the treatment of one of his
contacts
by a member
of the British Consulate.138
The
officials commented: “Our despair with the
136
eGram
36500/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 5 September 2007, ‘Iraq:
Ministerial Committee on National
Security, 4
September’.
137
BBC Radio
4, 3
September 2007, Today
Programme.
138
Email
government official working closely with the military, 5 September
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
The Phantom Menace’.
236