4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

“So it is possible … to conclude that if you are being told that the production is

continuing, it’s possible to conclude that therefore the issue is growing …”445

838. Sir John confirmed that meant the material was accumulating.

839. Asked about the sourcing for the reports of 11 and 23 September, Sir John replied:

“… that source was not substantiated and it was the first of the reporting to be

withdrawn … in late July 2003.”

840. Asked whether the SIS reporting, of 11 and 23 September, might have justified

Mr Blair’s use of the word “growing”, Sir Richard Dearlove replied:

“… maybe they account for the Prime Minister saying ‘growing’. I don’t know.

I am not sure whether that is true or not.”446

841. Mr Blair’s statements in his Foreword to the dossier about the nature of

the threat posed by Iraq to UK interests and that he believed “the assessed

intelligence” had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein had

“continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues

in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons” are addressed earlier in this Section.

842. The references to Iraq’s chemical and biological programmes in the statement

reflected the material in the Foreword and the dossier.

843. A reference to material being “missing” as well as “unaccounted for” was new

and implied the material had existed. The word was added to the draft version of

23 September.

844. In his statement to Parliament on 24 September, about Iraq’s efforts

to develop nuclear weapons, Mr Blair said that “we know” Saddam Hussein

“has bought or attempted to buy” material which could be used in a nuclear

weapons programme.

845. Mr Blair’s description in his evidence to the Inquiry, that the information on

Iraqi procurement activities in the dossier “could indicate a continuing interest in

nuclear weapons” would have been a more accurate description of the position.

846. In listing Iraq’s attempts to procure prohibited technology and materials which

could be used in a nuclear weapons programme, which had been set out in the dossier

(page 26), Mr Blair stated:

“But we now know the following … Saddam has bought or attempted to buy …”

847. The dossier said only that intelligence showed “attempts to purchase”.

445 Private hearing, 5 May 2010, pages 14-15.

446 Private hearing, 13 July 2002, page 31.

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