14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
40.
On the Armed
Forces’ ability to conduct multiple, simultaneous operations, the
MOD
wrote:
“The
capability of our forces is strained not just by the scale of
operations, but by the
number of
simultaneous or near‑simultaneous operations. Since the SDR we
have
assumed
that we should plan to be able to undertake either a single major
operation
(of a
similar scale and duration to our contribution to the Gulf War in
1990‑91),
or
undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale
(as in the
mid‑1990s
in Bosnia), while retaining the ability to mount a second
substantial
deployment
– which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and
air
forces – if
this were made necessary by a second crisis. We would not,
however,
expect both
deployments to involve war‑fighting or to maintain them
simultaneously
for longer
than 6 months.”
41.
The MOD had
“analysed a set of plausible and realistic scenarios” to
assess
the demands
potentially faced by the UK overseas. That work had taken account
of
lessons
learned from operations, including in Afghanistan. The MOD
recognised that the
particular
scenarios it had envisaged may not be “replicated precisely in real
life”, but
they did
allow the MOD to “draw general conclusions about the capabilities
that may be
particularly
important”.
42.
In assessing
capabilities for operations abroad, the MOD concluded that the
SDR
was
“generally taking our Armed Forces in the right direction, but
reinforced the growing
importance”
already attached to “network‑centric capability”. That concept had
“emerged
substantially
in the 1991 Gulf Conflict” and “demonstrated how precision weapons
and
shared
information technologies could be linked together to produce
devastating military
effects
with unparalleled speed and accuracy”.
43.
Network‑centric
capability had three elements:
•
sensors (to
gather information);
•
a network
(to fuse, communicate and exploit the information);
and
•
strike
assets to deliver military effect.
44.
The MOD stated
that it had already invested in a range of sensors,
including
airborne
stand‑off surveillance such as Nimrod MRA4, battlefield UAVs
and
communications
(including BOWMAN).
45.
The planning
and procurement of equipment for the post‑conflict phase (Phase
IV)
was
constrained by the lack of an agreed concept of operations
(CONOPS).
46.
Wider planning
for the post‑conflict phase is addressed in Section
6.5.
47.
The funding
arrangements for the procurement of equipment are addressed
in
Section
13.1.
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