8 | The
invasion
Baghdad. It
would be helpful to have a short paper setting out our options … to
act
as a
framework for discussion at this evening’s Ministerial
Briefing.”
“The
military machine is working on a more thorough assessment to this
complex
question.
My own quick and dirty run through of some key points is attached,
purely
to prompt
Ministerial discussion.” 141
221.
Mr Lee
pointed out that:
•
Baghdad was
the CFLCC and Coalition main effort. Reinforcements might
be
required in
Baghdad, but using 7 Armoured Brigade in this role would take
time
and “risks
unattended disaster in Basra”.
•
1 (UK) Div
had insufficient forces to guarantee success in Basra, and
attempting
to take
Basra by force would divide the Coalition effort.
•
Success in
Basra would support an information operations “message
to
Baghdad”.
222.
Mr Lee
did not advocate any particular course of action but stated that
the key
question
was: “When does political/media/humanitarian pressure (primarily on
the UK)
in Basra
reach the point at which it destabilises the
Coalition?”
223.
A note by
Mr Blair in the No.10 files for 26 March indicates his
concerns about
Iraq.142
In relation
to the military campaign, they were:
“… use
airpower more effectively; control Iraq’s media; take out
communications;
show Basra
in new hands with popular support; destroy Republican
Guards
divisions;
the strategy for Baghdad.”
224.
The JIC
assessed on 26 March that the Iraqi regime was still in
control
of urban
centres; the prospects for an early collapse of the Iraqi
regime
had
lessened; and the defence of Baghdad could be more determined
and
professional
than predicted.
225.
The JIC
suggested that a major success, such as breaking the regime’s
hold
over a
significant city such as Basra, could have an impact on the
perception that
the regime
was still in control.
226.
On 26 March,
the JIC discussed the first week of the campaign in
Iraq.143
Members
considered
whether the regime believed it could survive and negotiate a
settlement, and
whether
most Iraqis would at least acquiesce to the military
action.
141
Minute DG
Op Pol to PS/SofS [MOD], 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Dealing with
Basrah’.
142
Note Blair,
26 March 2003, ‘Iraq’.
143
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The First
Week’.
39