9.6  |  27 June 2007 to April 2008

951.  Mr Brown and Prime Minister Maliki spoke by telephone on 3 April.471 The latter

explained that events in Basra had been difficult but they had been a good opportunity

to test the readiness of Iraqi Security Forces, which had undertaken their tasks with only

limited logistic support from the MNF.

952.  Mr Brown explained that all the UK’s actions had been intended to support

the restoration of law and order in Basra and the authority of the Iraqi Government;

4,000 UK troops continued to risk their lives to ensure that Iraq was stable and peaceful.

Prime Minister Maliki expressed his gratitude, but observed that the Iraqis had not been

informed about the agreement between the UK and JAM, which JAM had exploited.

Commanders in Basra had told Prime Minister Maliki that there had been insufficient

support for the Charge of the Knights from UK troops. In order to preserve the close

working relationship between Iraq and the UK, better co-ordination and communication

needed to be agreed.

953.  Mr Brown “regretted that a misunderstanding had arisen over the UK role” and said

that the UK “had offered full logistical support to the operations”. He expressed concern

that the UK had not been consulted in advance about Prime Minister Maliki’s operations

in Basra. Given the role and exposure of UK forces, it was important to ensure that this

did not happen again. Mr Prentice would be instructed to meet Prime Minister Maliki and

Dr Rubaie to go over the issues in more detail.

954.  Mr Prentice told the Inquiry that:

“We were not doing what Maliki … accused us of doing, which is taking ourselves

out of the fight and essentially giving free rein to the militias in Basra, which is what

he came to see as the role.”472

955.  The day after Mr Brown’s telephone call, a senior government official specialising

in the Middle East (2) wrote to Mr Jenkins to say that Prime Minister Maliki’s complaint

was unfounded.473 His advisers – Dr Rubaie, and Mr Tariq Abdullah – had been briefed

on the negotiations “at the outset and at various stages”. Although the Iraqi Government

had been “instinctively suspicious”, it did not oppose negotiations because they made an

early British withdrawal from the centre of Basra more likely.

956.  The senior official told Mr Jenkins that he was unaware of any former detainees

having returned to violence before the start of the Charge of the Knights. Attacks on

the COB had been largely the work of “splinter groups”. Information suggested that the

releases had in fact “encouraged JAM towards pragmatism rather than radicalism”.

471  Letter Fletcher to Hickey, 4 April 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone Call with Iraqi Prime Minister,

3 April’.

472  Private hearing, 15 June 2010, page 31.

473  Minute senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2) to Jenkins, 4 April 2008,

‘[NAME OF OPERATION]: GOI complaints’.

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