The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1427.
ACM Stirrup
met the Commanding Officer of the Monitoring, Mentoring
and
Training
Battlegroup who assured him that 14th Division were on track
to be ready by
June 2008.
The Chief of Police Training Adviser told him that
Maj Gen Jalil was “proving
very
dynamic, robust and effective, particularly in fighting the MOI’s
reluctance to root
out militia
influences” but that only 48 percent of Basra police had been
trained.
1428.
On 8 October,
Lt Gen Odierno had advised Gen Petraeus that he
recommended
Basra for
PIC in December.1307
He had been
encouraged by the positive impact that
Gen Mohan
and Maj Gen Jalil were having but remained concerned by
reports of militia
influence
within the Basra ISF. Maj Gen Binns commented: “Not a
ringing endorsement,
but a
positive step and an endorsement we’ve been trying to achieve since
April
this year.”
1429.
Basra
transitioned to PIC on 16 December 2007 (described in Section
9.6).
1430.
When asked
about the capability of the ISF in December 2007 during
his
evidence to
the Inquiry, Maj Gen Binns said:
“… they had
weaknesses … they were well trained, as individuals, but
their
leadership
was not experienced, they were capable of conducting tactical,
low‑level
operations,
but their ability to conduct manoeuvre, to sustain themselves
logistically,
was a
challenge to them.
“But I
thought they wouldn’t get better until they were given
responsibility … it was a
bit like
taking the stabilisers off a child’s bike. They were going to
wobble for a while
and I was
there to make sure they didn’t fall over.”1308
1431.
On the
police’s capability at that time, Maj Gen Binns
said:
“The police
were a mixed bag. At their worst, they were trouble. They had
been
infiltrated
and they were a constraint on progress.
“At their
best, and there were some very good police units … they were good,
they
were
effective. The national police units, who came from Baghdad, were
highly
effective
and something that the Iraqis were particularly proud
of.”
1432.
On 20
December, the JIC assessed:
“Prospects
in Basra will depend on ISF willingness and ability to take on Shia
militias
or reach
and maintain an accommodation with them and on the ability of
local
political
leaders to broker deals which restrain political violence. All are
uncertain
at this
stage. The loss of either General Mohan or Jalil would remove a
stabilising
1307
Minute
Binns to CJO, 11 October 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update – 11 October
2007’.
1308
Public
hearing, 15 January 2010, pages 25‑26.
1309
JIC
Assessment, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Two Steps
Forward’.
386