10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
277.
Ministers also
agreed that departments should continue to recruit
additional
secondees
to ORHA, “with a view to a significant increase by 5 May”, and that
the UK
should
offer to play “a leading role in ORHA south-eastern regional HQ,
provided that
ORHA
leaders confirm that it would be coterminous with the emerging
UK-led security
sector and
that we will not pay programme costs”.
278.
Mr Chilcott
led the inter-departmental scoping visit to ORHA from 27 to 28
April.157
279.
Mr Chilcott
reported to Mr Edward Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East and
North
Africa,
that Maj Gen Cross was “a star act” but was “frustrated and angry
at Whitehall’s
slowness to
support him”, particularly DFID and the MOD. Mr Chilcott hoped
that the
progress
now being made would show Maj Gen Cross that “Ministers’ enthusiasm
for
ORHA is
finally being translated into extra staff”.
280.
Mr Chilcott
also reported that security and communications were the
biggest
problems
facing ORHA staff.
281.
The FCO has
not been able to provide the Inquiry with a copy of
Mr Chilcott’s
report on
the case for reinforcing ORHA(South).
282.
The impact of
deteriorating security on the deployment of civilian personnel to
Iraq
is
addressed in Section 15.1.
283.
A Cabinet
Office report to Ministers on 1 May 2003 stated that “the UK recce
team”
had
confirmed the feasibility of “a leading UK regional role in the
south east” and would
be
recommending a “substantial UK presence”.158
284.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Cross described both his time
with ORHA
in Kuwait
and his initial experience in Baghdad:
“Garner had
made it clear that he wanted me to be his ‘Coalition’
Deputy,
notwithstanding
the fact that the UK had still not confirmed publicly that we
had
anyone in
his team. I was still a LO [liaison officer] with a very small
team, and
I
was not receiving any clear direction from Whitehall, other
than not to commit the
UK to
anything!
…
“My UK team
was strengthened a little, including a very useful media team
provided
by Alistair
Campbell, effectively from within No 10. But my attempts to get
significant
numbers of
additional UK personnel were frustratingly slow …
…
157
Minute
Chilcott to Chaplin, 30 April 2003, ‘Visit to Iraq’.
158
Letter
Drummond to Owen, 1 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Report to Ministers’ attaching
Paper Cabinet Office,
1 May 2003,
‘Iraq: Update for Ministers’.
53