1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
208.
In a letter to
the President of the Security Council on 17 March 1996,
Mr Aziz
stated that
the problems related to the special nature of the sites and that
the delays
were “no
longer than the time necessitated by … practical
factors”.99
Mr Aziz
cited the
agreement
in July 1993, in response to Iraq’s concerns in respect of its
sovereignty,
internal
security and the dignity of the people and State of Iraq, that
UNSCOM and the
IAEA
intention was to implement their plans “in the least intrusive
manner consistent
with
effective monitoring and verification in the circumstances
prevailing, with all due
regard to
the legitimate concerns of Iraq … in accordance with the Charter of
the
United
Nations”. In addition, two of the requests, on 8 and 15 March,
had been made
on a
Friday. Appropriate arrangements had been made for the inspections
to proceed,
including
on two occasions after telephone conversations with
Mr Ekéus.
209.
Mr Aziz
also stated that the allegations that equipment could have been
removed
and some
documents burnt were “not realistic” given the presence of “more
than
50 inspectors
with 16 vehicles” surrounding the sites, helicopter surveillance
and
the subsequent
inspections.
210.
Mr Aziz
reaffirmed that Iraq had “no intention of impeding” UNSCOM’s tasks.
“On
the
contrary”, it was “keen” to continue to work with UNSCOM to fulfil
its tasks “as soon
as
possible”. But Iraq expected UNSCOM, in discharging its duties, “to
adhere” to its
“undertakings
towards Iraq by respecting its sovereignty, dignity and national
security”.
211.
Mr Aziz
also wrote that he expected the Security Council “to deal with this
issue in
an
objective manner which would balance Iraq’s obligations towards the
Security Council
and the
Council’s obligations towards Iraq in accordance with the
principles of the United
Nations
Charter and the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the
Council”.
212.
The incidents
in which UNSCOM inspection teams were denied immediate
and
unconditional access to sites prompted a statement by the President
of the
Security
Council that “Iraq’s delays in permitting the inspection team
recently in Iraq
access
to the sites concerned constitute clear violations by
Iraq of the provisions of
resolutions 687
(1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991)”.
213.
On
27 March 1996, as part of developing the OMV system, the
Security Council
adopted
resolution 1051 (1996), which implemented a mechanism for
monitoring sales
or supplies
of items “relevant to the implementation of Section C of resolution
687 (1991)
and other
relevant resolutions”.100
214.
To replace the
previous reporting systems, the resolution also consolidated
the
progress
reports on UNSCOM and the IAEA’s activities into reports every six
months
from the UN
on all aspects of its work.
99
UN Security
Council, 18 March 1998, ‘Letter dated 17 March 1996 from
the Deputy Prime Minister of the
Republic of
Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council’
(S/1996/204).
100
UN Security
Council resolution 1051 (1996).
61