The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
333.
Drafts were
commissioned at a meeting on 21 February from the:
•
FCO on
policy objectives towards Iraq and the wider region, a tightened
policy
of containment,
and legal advice on regime change;
•
MOD on the
military options for regime change; and
•
SIS on
possible successor regimes.
334.
A draft paper
had been circulated on 28 February for a discussion on 1 March
and
a further
draft on 5 March for discussion the same day.
335.
Mr Drummond
had chaired the two discussions but he was unable to recall
them
in any
detail and the files did not contain records of the contributions
or what was
discussed:
“The paper
clearly drew on the JIC and Assessments Staff judgements about
the
likelihood
of Saddam having WMD and that his regime was unlikely to be
removed
by internal
opposition … There was debate about continuing containment and
that
is recorded
in the paper as an option, before considering regime change and
the
options for
how that could be achieved.”
“As a
background paper, no recommendations were made and … it was
submitted
as being in
close consultation with FCO, MOD, SIS and the Assessment Staff
rather
than agreed
word for word with them.”
337.
After Sir
David Manning’s meeting on 7 March, Mr Drummond had “made
some
changes …
after further consultation” with the FCO, MOD and SIS, which
“covered the
difficulty
of identifying successor regimes, that it was unlikely Iraq would
disintegrate”,
and changes
clarifying the legal advice.
338.
Mr Drummond
concluded:
“At the
time of drafting, we expected this paper to be the first of several
that would
help
Ministers to reach conclusions on policy towards Iraq and hoped
that there
would be
discussion with them.”
339.
In his
statement, Mr Tom Dodd, who was a desk officer in OD Sec, wrote
that he
was the
principal drafter of the paper.124
He made
similar points to Mr Drummond about
the
process, with more detail of the individuals and Departments with
whom Mr Dodd
had held
bilateral discussions.
340.
The judgements
in the paper “drew on the collective wisdom of the time,
informed
by JIC
judgements of the state of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein”. The
policy
judgements
had been “formulated in the first instance” by himself and Mr
Drummond,
124
Statement,
3 April 2013, pages 1-2.
446