The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
495.
On 24
February, the FCO briefed the AHMGIR on the election
outcome.267
In
discussion,
the point was made that the elections would “change the feel of our
bilateral
relationship
with the new Iraqi Government as they would now have the confidence
that
came from
having a mandate”.
496.
The FCO
reported that several Sunni groups appeared to have recognised
that
boycotting
the elections had been “counter-productive” and there were signs
some were
looking to
join the political process.
497.
In discussion
it was suggested that a “key objective” for the UK would be to
protect
the
provision in the TAL that the three provinces could veto the
Constitution. Originally
seen as
safeguarding Kurdish interests, this was now even more important
for the Sunni.
498.
Ministers
asked for a plan for “co-ordinated bilateral contacts” with the new
Iraqi
Government
as soon as it was in place.
499.
On 25 February
the JIC considered the links between Syria and the
Iraqi
insurgency.268
It judged
that:
“Syria’s
policy towards Iraq is one of limited support for the insurgency …
Its attitude
to
jihadists and Iraqi Ba’athists differs markedly: some concern and
action against
jihadists;
tolerance, even encouragement, of Ba’athists.”
500.
Mr Blair wrote
a note to his Private Secretary on 25 February instructing
that
Mr Straw
be “put in charge” of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq and
asked to
minute him
each week with actions on “eg reconstruction in the South; Sunni
outreach;
progress on
security plan”.269
501.
Ms Aldred
chaired a video conference discussion of the strategy for 2005
paper
with the US
on 28 February.270
It was
agreed that the UK should send the US further
papers
setting out areas to be covered by a national policing plan for
Iraq; a high level
security
plan; and on a possible further international conference to follow
on from the
one held in
Sharm el Sheikh in November 2004.
502.
Referring to
negotiations on the formation of the ITG, Mr Blair commented
to
President
Bush on 1 March that: “We needed a stable outcome.”271
267
Minutes, 24
February 2005, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
268
JIC
Assessment, 25 February 2005, ‘Syria and the Iraqi
Insurgency’.
269
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 25 February
2005, ‘Iraq Update’.
270
Minute
Fergusson to Sheinwald, 2 March 2005, ‘Iraq: VTC meeting with
NSC/Department of State/
Pentagon,
28 February 2005’.
271
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 2 March 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush, 1 March:
Middle East’.
474