1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
situation
on the ground; and that, in the event of evidence of renewed
oppression
of the
Shia, we would resume patrolling (although, in reality, this is
most unlikely).
We should
maintain enforcement of the northern NFZ as a sign of our
continued
commitment
to the Kurds …
…
“Abandoning
the SNFZ [southern NFZ] would be unpopular with the Kuwaitis
who
have come
to regard it as vital for their defence. We would need to reassure
them
that we had
other equally effective ways to fulfil our commitment to their
defence and
the
containment of Iraq.”
32.
Mr Simon Webb,
MOD Director General Operational Policy, offered his
comments
on the
draft paper in a letter to Mr McKane on 30 October.29
He
suggested that the
Government
needed to consider whether the conclusions agreed by DOP in
1999
“remained
extant”. Mr Webb stated that he was “sceptical about Saddam’s
susceptibility
to
inducements” and suggested that:
“A surer
foundation would be to re-assess our strategic objectives for Iraq
in a
regional
context, and then look imaginatively at the options – military but
also
others –
for achieving them.”
33.
The Cabinet
Office chaired a meeting to discuss the draft paper on 31
October.30
Officials
concluded that the UK’s policy objectives had not changed but that
a new
US
Administration was likely to review its position, starting from “a
blank piece of
paper”. In
preparing to engage with the US, the UK should itself take a fresh
look
at possible
approaches.
34.
Officials
commissioned a revised paper covering the wider context and the
different
options,
including their military dimensions, setting out their advantages,
disadvantages,
opportunities
and risks. The revised paper would inform discussions with the
US.
35.
On 1 November,
with the US Presidential elections imminent, the JIC
assessed
the
prospects for Iraq co-operating with resolution
1284.31
The JIC had
judged in early
2000 that
Saddam Hussein was unlikely to co-operate with resolution 1284 and
allow
inspectors
back into Iraq until after those elections.
36.
The JIC stated
that the elements of resolution 1284 which were favourable to
Iraq,
such as
abolishing the ceiling on approved oil exports and increasing the
humanitarian
programme,
had been implemented. But Iraq continued publicly to reject the
resolution
and
UNMOVIC. Unless UNMOVIC inspectors were allowed into Iraq, there
could be no
29
Letter Webb
to McKane, 30 October 2000, ‘Iraq’.
30
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 31 October 2000, ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
31
JIC
Assessment, 1 November 2000, ‘Iraq: Prospects for Co-operation with
UNSCR 1284’.
197