The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
65.
In its Key
Judgements, which were very similar to those of 19 April,
the
JIC
concluded:
•
“No
regional state, including Iran and Syria, would give Iraq
significant practical
support
against a US‑led attack.”
•
“Turkey
would be willing to provide basing for a US‑led attack on Iraq.
Provided
there were
no worsening of the security situation in Palestine, Kuwait […]
would
provide
basing or staging support […].”
•
“Saudi
Arabia would be very unlikely to provide basing. It might approve
some
over‑flights,
but possibly only for non‑offensive operations. It would
distance
itself from
US‑led military action, […].”
•
“Arab
governments’ support would be badly damaged if Israel used a
US‑led
attack on
Iraq […]. Their support might also be reduced if any military
campaign
is
prolonged or causes many civilian casualties.”
•
“A US‑led
attack on Iraq would spark large‑scale protests across the Arab
world.
Security
forces would probably be able to maintain control, at least
initially, […]
Anti‑Western
sentiment in the region would not dissipate quickly and could
boost
popular
sympathy for extremist causes, including Al Qaida.”21
66.
In the
Assessment itself, the JIC stated that Iraq had “no real allies”
but regional
States were
influenced by a long list of factors which made “winning any
support [for
military
action] an uphill struggle”. Those factors were:
•
There was a
“deep Arab concern” that they were “being called on to support
an
attack on a
fellow Muslim country.
•
Events in
Israel/Palestine remained “a primary focus” for Arab
States:
“No Arab State
is persuaded that Saddam should be dealt with before
there
is a substantial
movement towards resolution of the Palestinian
problem.”
•
For Arab
States, “concerns about military action” owed “more to fears
about
potential
internal instability than to any affection for
Saddam”.
•
There was
“uncertainty over US resolve”. Regional support might “firm
up
when a
credible plan” was “on the table” and preparations had
begun:
“A quick
build up and a rapid and decisive victory,
with low civilian
casualties,
would minimise popular discontent, especially if the Iraqi
people
welcomed
Saddam’s overthrow”.
•
“A UN
Security Council resolution justifying force would make it easier
for
regional
governments to justify publicly their acquiescence to US military
action.
Otherwise,
regional States would want stronger evidence of Iraq’s
continued
pursuit of
WMD and that the return of weapons inspectors had been
visibly
pursued and
exhausted.”
21
JIC
Assessment, 5 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes and Impact of
Military Action’.
104