The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
308.
On
21 January, Gen Walker was advised that the delivery times for
UORs had
been
refined to reflect the compressed timeframes and there were risks
associated with
the
inability to deliver some key UORs within those.147
Allowance
had now been made
to
integrate UORs but no allowance had been made for any additional
training required,
or any
delays in loading or transit to theatre. The tactical implications
of the delivery
shortfalls
were “not yet well understood”.
309.
Gen Walker was
advised that:
•
The US
commitment to loan Combat ID capability had so far proved
inconclusive
and there
would be “no
guarantee of US support”.
•
The DEC was
“increasingly optimistic” they would have “full Target ID
capability”,
but the
necessary measures would have to be fitted in theatre.
•
Confidence
in the delivery of NBC protection was decreasing.
•
The full
capability of the Challenger 2 tank’s dust mitigation and
AS90’s
environmental
enhancement were unlikely to be available until after
31 March
and would
have to be fitted in theatre.
•
The fitting
of ballistic protection enhancements for Combat
Vehicle
Reconnaissance
(Tracked) vehicles148
“may have
to take place in theatre”.
•
There was
“little visibility” of the amount of desert clothing “in the hands
of
soldiers”
and the allocation of clothing had already been reduced from
three
sets per
man to two sets per man to “try and prevent a shortfall at the
start of
operations”.
It was necessary to airlift clothing into theatre to meet
operational
timelines
and “to have a favourable delivery of sizes”. If both of these
were
achieved,
it was “possible that all troops will have desert clothing and
boots in
time for
the start of operations”.
•
75 percent
of the required unhardened COLPRO would be ready by the start
of
March, with
the full requirement being met in theatre by
31 March.
•
There was
“insufficient stock” of COLPRO seals for Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
(AFVs) and
more could not be procured in time. The lead time to procure
seals
was 12 to
36 months.
•
The
situation had improved “markedly” on ECBA, and Gen Walker could
“be
confident”
that it would be delivered “to all troops in time for the committal
of any
ground
troops”.
•
The full
requirement for battlefield ambulances, however, would not be
upgraded
in time for
the anticipated start of operations.
•
The
availability of sand filters for Lynx helicopters was driving the
number of
helicopters
to be deployed.
147
Minute DMO
MO3 to MA1/CGS, 21 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC UOR Delivery and
Risks – Information
Brief’.
148
A type of
Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV).
46