The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
I know all
this can be made to sound corny or even … self-deceiving in terms
of our
effect on
US decision-making. I was well aware that ultimately the US would
take its
own
decisions in its own interests. But I was also aware that … Britain
and Europe
were going
to face a much more uncertain future without America … our
alliance
with the US
mattered …
“So when
they had need of us, were we really going to refuse; or, even
worse,
hope they
succeeded but could do it without us? I reflected and felt the
weight of an
alliance
and its history, not oppressively but insistently, a call to duty,
a call to act, a
call to be
at their side, not distant from it, when they felt
imperilled.” 296
731.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“We needed
to get alongside that [US] planning and be part of it. Of course,
as ever,
that
presented a dilemma: If you wanted to be part of the planning, you
had to be, at
least in
principle, open to being part of the action early on, because I
could see …
this might
have to end with Saddam’s forcible removal, I resolved to be part
of the
planning.
From around April, we were then fairly closely involved even in the
early
stages of
US thinking.
“None of
this meant that war was certain. It wasn’t and indeed a constant
part of
the
interaction between George and myself through those months,
probably up to
around
November, was acute anxiety that since we were planning for the
possible,
that meant
in the media mind that it was inevitable. We had the basic
concepts
ironed out:
Saddam had to comply with the UN resolutions and let the
inspectors
back in: he
couldn’t, on this occasion, be allowed to mess about – his
compliance
had to be
total; and if he refused we were going to be in a position where we
were
capable of
removing him. So the diplomacy and the planning proceeded
along
separate
but plainly at certain points connected tracks.
“It made
domestic politics, however, highly uncomfortable. Naturally
people
were
reading the reports, assuming everything was decided and taking
positions
accordingly.
If we said that war was not agreed, they asked if we were
planning;
if we
accepted we were doing some form of planning, that meant war was
indeed
agreed. The
notion of a contingency was too subtle. And, to be fair, many of
the
noises
emanating from parts of the US system did suggest that there was
only one
direction
in which policy should go.” 297
732.
In his account
of the discussions with President Bush, Mr Blair
wrote:
“Behind
closed doors … our talk was more nuanced. We shared the
analysis
about the
nature of the Saddam government, its risk to security and also
the
wider
problems of the region. My concern then and subsequently was to
locate
296
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
297
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
522