8 | The
invasion
both in the
short term and in the aftermath. Commander 1 (UK) Div is also
conscious
of the
continuing threat posed by Iraqi forces within missile range of
Basra … And
most
importantly, entry to Basra is a decision for the Coalition land
commander, and
is not
Commander 1 (UK) Div’s call.”
311.
Mr Johnson
also set out the specific actions being undertaken by UK
forces,
including
to: “Isolate the community from regime propaganda and replace it
with our own
information.”
Radio broadcasts were being used to convey messages, including
that:
•
“unlike
1991, we will not stop until we have overcome this resistance
and
overthrown
the regime”;
•
“we will
enter Basra when the time is right”; and
•
“we will
work to relieve the population’s hardship when we do
enter”.
312.
Mr Johnson
wrote that it was “important to ensure we do not undermine
our
credibility
by making promises we cannot fulfil”.
313.
Mr Johnson
described the raids and attacks at the heart of the UK approach
in
Basra. They
included a raid on the State Security Organisation in az-Zubayr, an
air strike
on the
Intelligence headquarters in Basra and a raid into Basra which
attacked the TV
station and
destroyed two statues of Saddam Hussein. A “further encroachment”
into
the outskirts
of Basra was in progress as Mr Johnson wrote his advice,
focused on the
Abu Al
Khasib area to the southeast of Basra.
314.
In the event
of “the situation in Basra disintegrating into chaos”,
Mr Johnson
told
Mr Hoon that Maj Gen Brims had developed contingency plans.
They included
leaving a
route to the north open “to enable irregular forces to leave – he
has troops
positioned
further north who would engage them at a safe distance from Basra
itself –
and to
forestall accusations that he is laying siege to the city”. He was
also prepared
to facilitate
access for the delivery of humanitarian aid and repairs to key
infrastructure
as
necessary; and to deploy 7 Armoured Brigade into the city with
tanks.
315.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Mr Hoon on 31 March with “Some personal
thoughts
about
handling the wider [political/military] issues of the
campaign.” 177
316.
In the context
of US/UK relations, Sir Kevin cautioned:
“… we need
to take some care to avoid a situation where the US is focused
on
Baghdad and
the UK regards the ‘exemplar’ of Basra as its own contribution. I
found
David
Johnson’s note of 30 March instructive in this respect where he
reminds us of
what
US overall
strategy is and that ‘entry into Basra is a decision for the
Coalition
Land
[Coalition Forces Land Component] Commander, [Lt] Gen McKiernan,
and
is not
Commander 1 (UK) Div’s call’. We tend, perhaps because of the way
we get
our twice
daily briefings from PJHQ, to assume that this is a UK lead. We
should
177
Minute
Tebbit to Secretary of State [MOD], 31 March 2003,
‘Iraq’.
53