The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
118.
Mr Quarrey
commented on the Cabinet Office paper:
“Not an
encouraging picture … It looks like we are a long way from the sort
of
integrated
political/security/reconstruction packages for these key cities
that we,
the US
and Allawi keep talking about.
“We must do
better on this. The lack of any reference in the DFID note to this
key
issue is
striking.”
119.
Mr Blair
replied: “We need to get tougher with DFID on this. Let me
minute
Hilary [Benn].
It’s not good enough.” 65
120.
Major General
Andrew Farquhar, the British Deputy Commanding General
of
Operations
in the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I), reported on 24 October
that the
US had
allocated US$7m from CERPs for projects in the immediate aftermath
of military
operations
in Fallujah.66
121.
Mr Blair
wrote to Mr Benn on 26 October:
“I remain
concerned that actual delivery of reconstruction on the ground is
far
too slow
…
“We must
accelerate the pace of reconstruction, not least to support the
political
process as
we head towards the elections. The note [on the Tokyo donors
meeting]
includes
some good ideas on pressing the UN and World Bank. But we also
need
to increase
the impact of your bilateral programme in the short term. And we
need
to find
more effective ways of getting the US to spend
their funds more quickly and
with greater
impact.
“I am
particularly concerned about the lack of follow-through
on reconstruction in
those
cities and towns where the IIG, with MNF support, has regained
control from
insurgents
(e.g. Najaf, Samarra, Tal Afar). These are, of course, not in the
MND(SE)
region
where our spending is concentrated. But DFID has considerable
experience
of
post-conflict situations which I would like to see us using across
Iraq.” 67
122.
Mr Hoon
briefed the 28 October meeting of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on
Iraq
on US
military plans for a “short, sharp campaign” in
Fallujah.68
123.
At the
meeting, Mr Benn said that DFID continued to press the PCO,
but a recent
proposal to
second a UK development adviser to the PCO had been turned down by
the
US. It was
difficult for the UK to offer additional assistance in cities like
Fallujah “as the
US was
already engaged and sufficient funds were available”.
65
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 22 October 2004,
‘Iraq Reconstruction’.
66
Telegram
301 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 October 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah:
Military Preparations:
ISF Numbers
and Capability’.
67
Minute
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for International Development,
26 October 2004, [untitled].
68
Minutes, 28
October 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
216