4.4 | The
search for WMD
580.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed Dr Kay’s departure in their
video
conference
on 14 January.322
Mr Blair
said that Dr Kay’s departure would have an impact
in the UK
media. He hoped the CIA would work with the UK on
handling.
581.
In a Cabinet
discussion of the situation in Iraq on 15 January, a number of
points
were made
on WMD, including that:
•
Public
opinion continued to focus on the absence of WMD discovered in
Iraq,
while the
broader counter-proliferation story was inadequately
covered.
•
The report
by Dr Blix in early 2003 (the “clusters” document of 6 March,
see
Section 3.7)
had provided 173 pages of material about Iraq’s WMD
programme,
including
10,000 litres of anthrax unaccounted for. There was a
“strong
presumption
of its continued existence”.
•
The
counter-proliferation progress in other countries, and “Libya in
particular”
was
“dramatic”. The military action in Iraq had had a “hugely
beneficial effect on
the
international climate, but this was insufficiently recognised at
home”.323
582.
Mr Blair
concluded that the counter-proliferation successes which had
been
registered
since the invasion of Iraq were “considerable and he hoped that
there would
be further
developments in the next few weeks. The Government’s supporters
need to
be briefed
accordingly.”
583.
On
16 January, Mr Scarlett informed No.10 of the dates of a
series of US
Congressional
hearings in February and March relevant to Iraqi
WMD.324
Potentially
the
most
controversial was Mr Tenet’s appearance on 4 March at a
closed session of the
Senate
Intelligence Committee on pre-conflict Iraq-related intelligence,
and there would
almost
certainly be an open session. It would be important to stay in
contact with US
briefing
plans.
584.
In his State
of the Union address on 20 January, President Bush reported
that:
“We’re
seeking all the facts. Already the Kay report [the ISG Interim
Report]
identified
dozens of weapons of mass destruction-related program activities
and
significant
amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United
Nations.
Had we
failed to act, the dictator’s weapons of mass destruction programs
would
continue to
this day. Had we failed to act, Security Council resolutions on
Iraq
would have
been revealed as empty threats, weakening the United Nations
and
encouraging
defiance by dictators around the world.”325
322
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 14 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video-conference with President
Bush,
14 January 2004’.
323
Cabinet
Conclusions, 15 January 2004.
324
Minute
Scarlett to Rycroft, 16 January 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: US
Congressional Hearings’.
325
The White
House, 20 January 2004, State of
the Union Address.
539