The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

been a little hand to mouth. I fear No.10 will not accept our telling them that we can’t

do things because we don’t have the people. So I hope you will be sympathetic if,

after a few weeks on the job, I make further bids for staff.” 131

193. At the Iraq Senior Officials Group (ISOG) on 23 September, Mr David Richmond,

the Prime Minister’s Deputy Special Representative on Iraq, reported that UK

“influence in CPA Baghdad is limited; we supply only 100 out of its 1,000 staff there”.132

Mr Richmond recommended that deployment of UK secondees be “continuously

reviewed so that they are where we most need them. The UK is still under‑represented

at senior level; we should continue to seek senior posts as they become available.”

194. Sir David Richmond told the Inquiry:

“I don’t think we asked for a lot more people. What we wanted was Arabic

speakers for obvious reasons, and we had Charles Heatley [CPA spokesman, see

Section 10.1] and his successor, both of whom were very good Arabic speakers,

but we probably could have done with more.” 133

195. Sir David also observed that “lack of continuity was a far greater problem than

a lack of skills”.134

196. On 15 October, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that:

“The security situation remains difficult in central Iraq. The upward trend in the

number of attacks against the Coalition Forces (CF) shows no sign of abatement …

The vast majority of attacks (some 80 percent) occur in Baghdad and the

surrounding Sunni Arab areas … Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are the single

most common form of attack, some increasingly sophisticated, and we have also

seen more mortars being employed.

…

“The situation in the UK Area of Responsibility in the South remains relatively calm.

In the first week of October, out of 174 attacks against CF in Iraq, only four were

against troops in MND(SE). The mortar attack against the British base in Basra on

8 October was a serious incident, but the trend continues to be a relatively low level

of attacks.” 135

197. In early October, Sir Hilary Synnott reported “markedly improved attitudes

throughout the South over the last three months, and especially when compared with

the hot humid days of early August when tempers exploded into violence and killings”.136

131 Minute Buck to Charlton, 22 September 2003, ‘Staffing for the Iraq Directorate’.

132 Minute [Cabinet Office junior official] to Sheinwald, 25 September 2003, ‘Iraq Senior Officials

Group Meeting’.

133 Public hearing, 26 January 2011, page 87.

134 Public hearing, 26 January 2011, page 79.

135 JIC Assessment, 15 October 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.

136 Telegram 33 CPA Basra to FCO London, 9 October 2003, ‘South Iraq: The Political Scene’.

276