The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Financial Year 2008/09 are £55m. These should reduce to below £50m in 2009/10.

The majority of these are recovered by FCO from cost‑sharers (other departments,

programme budgets, tenants).”

555.  On 13 January 2009, Mr Miliband’s Private Office circulated a draft strategy for

“UK policy towards and relations with Iraq following military drawdown”.367 It had been

agreed by officials from all interested departments and by Mr Miliband.

556.  Annex C set out proposals for three posts in Baghdad, Basra and Erbil:

• Baghdad. Any significant disengagement would reduce the UK’s influence and

be seen as an acknowledgement of failure. The FCO assessed that the security

situation allowed road moves between the Embassy and the airport, rather than

the RAF helicopter air bridge, but that Iraqiisation of security in the International

Zone from 2009 would require additional investment in security measures.

• Basra. The FCO did not believe it would be cost‑effective to maintain the same

level of civilian presence after the departure of UK combat forces. The US was

likely to become the public face of the Coalition in southern Iraq and the security

situation did not yet permit travel between Basra and the COB without military

assistance. The FCO proposed reducing the number of UK‑based FCO staff

from nine to three or four; DFID would not keep resident staff in Basra after June

2009, but would pay the cost of two “virtual” slots to guarantee accommodation

for visiting staff.

• Erbil. The policy case for retaining a UK presence was strong, but the cost per

head of operating in Erbil was extremely high and the location in the Khanzad

Hotel was not sustainable on security grounds. The FCO intended to work on

a more sustainable and cost‑effective arrangement.

557.  Mr Alistair Darling (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), Mr John Hutton (the Defence

Secretary) and Mr Douglas Alexander (the International Development Secretary) all

agreed to the proposed strategy.368

558.  Mr Baker visited Basra from 15 to 18 February 2009.369 He reported to Dr Jenkins

that the security situation continued to improve:

“I spent a day driving around Basra, including a visit to a date farm outside the town

in an area we could not have thought of visiting even three months ago … The

improvement in security has been mirrored on the COB, where body armour is no

longer required to be carried while on the base.

“While it is true that the key enabler for recent progress was Charge of the Knights,

it was our reaction to those events which was critical. It would have been easy to

367  Letter Hickey to Catsaras, 13 January 2009, ‘Iraq: strategy’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq: a review of strategy’.

368  Letter Jordan to Hickey, 26 January 2009, ‘Iraq strategy’; Letter Ferguson to Catsaras, 29 January

2009, ‘Iraq: strategy’; Letter Wright to Catsaras, 5 February 2009, ‘Iraq strategy’.

369  Minute Baker to Jenkins, 19 February 2009, ‘Iraq: Visit to Basra’.

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