The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
This is a
regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its
own
citizens …
This is a regime that agreed to international inspections – then
kicked out
the
inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the
civilised world.
“States
like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
arming to
threaten
the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction
these
regimes
pose a grave and growing danger.”83
168.
President
Bush’s speech prompted a major public debate on both sides of
the
Atlantic
about policy towards Iraq.
169.
There were
increasing indications that key figures in the US Administration
were
considering
military action to achieve regime change in Iraq and an emphasis on
the
potential
nexus for the fusion of WMD proliferation and
terrorism.
170.
On 13
February, Sir Christopher Meyer, British Ambassador to the US,
advised that
the hawks
in Washington felt that they had won the argument about the need
for military
action; and
that the US might want to issue an ultimatum on inspections but set
the bar
so high
that Iraq would never comply.84
The US
could want UK endorsement for their
vision by
mid-March.
171.
Mr William
Ehrman, FCO Director International Security, reported that a
meeting
with Sir
David Manning “and some others” had discussed Sir Christopher
Meyer’s
telegram
“and the question of legal considerations related to military
action against WMD
proliferation”.85
Mr Ehrman
said he had outlined the legal difficulty in trying to argue
that
WMD
development posed an “imminent threat”.
172.
President
Bush’s speech, Sir Christopher’s telegram and Mr Ehrman’s
report
of the
discussion, and the development of UK thinking, are covered in more
detail in
Section 3.2.
173.
Mr Tom
McKane, Deputy Head of OD Sec from 1999 to 2002, told the
Inquiry
that a
meeting in No.10 on 19 February (see Section 3.2) had commissioned
“a large
number of
papers … for the meeting between President Bush and Mr Blair
at Crawford,
Texas, in
early April 2002”.86
174.
The request
was recorded in Mr McKane’s minute of 19
February.87
The
papers
included:
•
“Iraq
A paper
analysing the options, the state of play on the UN resolutions,
the
legal base
and the internal dimension – the state of the opposition groups
etc.”
•
“WMD
A paper for
public consumption setting out the facts on WMD …”
83
The White
House, 29 January 2002, The
President’s State of the Union Address.
84
Telegram
197 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2002, ‘US/IRAQ: The
Momentum Builds’.
85
Minute
Ehrman to Goulty, 13 February 2002, ‘US/Iraq’.
86
Public
hearing, 19 January 2011, page 34.
87
Minute
McKane to Manning, 19 February 2002, ‘Papers for the Prime
Minister’.
46