The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
opinion, I
communicated it to my officials, to the Foreign Secretary and as it
happens
to Lord
Mayhew as well. There was no question of them performing a
pincer
735.
Lord Goldsmith
told the Inquiry:
“I told
them the conclusion that I had reached, and I think briefly why,
and I think we
then went
on to discuss – I think by that stage it was known that there was
going to
be a debate
the following Monday in the House of Lords, and I think we
discussed
something
about how that debate would be dealt with, the debate on the
legality
issue, I
think a Liberal Democrat Peer put down a motion.”304
736.
Asked for a
statement about the purpose of her involvement in a number
of
meetings
with Lord Goldsmith throughout the period before 18 March 2003,
Baroness
Morgan
wrote that the purpose of the meetings was to share
information.305
Her
role
was to
explain her perception of the Parliamentary and political mood. She
was aware
of claims
that she had somehow exerted pressure on the Attorney General to
alter
his advice
to provide a legal justification for military action, but wished to
state without
equivocation
that such allegations were untrue:
“… at no
point during any discussion at which I was present did I witness
any effort
to engage
with Lord Goldsmith as to the correctness of his legal analysis. I
am
certain
there was never any attempt by me, or by anyone else present, at
any of the
four
meetings to challenge the Attorney’s legal analysis
or
otherwise to influence
the
Attorney’s legal opinion.”
737.
On 15 March,
Baroness Morgan informed Mr Campbell by email that the
Attorney
General
would “make clear during the course of the week that there [was] a
sound legal
basis for
action should that prove necessary”.306
738.
On 13
March, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed withdrawing the
draft
resolution
on 17 March followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to
leave
within 48
hours. There would be no US military action until after the vote in
the
House of
Commons on 18 March.
739.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the prospects for a vote in the House
of
Commons and
a ‘Road Map’ for the Middle East on 13 March.307
303
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, page 201.
304
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, page 202.
305
Statement,
5 August 2011, pages 2-4.
306
Email
Morgan to Campbell, 15 March 2003, ‘AG’.
307
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq and MEPP: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush,
13
March’.
132