The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
progress
towards five objectives: security; governance; essential services;
the
economy;
and strategic communications.
“The
trouble was that it did not amount to an operational plan of
action, only a list of
subsidiary
objectives under each of these headings. There were no indications
about
how in
practice they would be achieved: no details of funding, of
personnel involved,
of support
systems or of timing. It was particularly notable that the ultimate
objective,
of handing
full sovereignty back to the Iraqi people, had no timing attached
to it
250.
‘Achieving the
Vision’ is described in more detail in Section 10.1.
251.
At the Chiefs
of Staff meeting on 23 July Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief
of
Joint
Operations, reported that Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Qusay and
Uday, had been
killed by
US forces after a gun battle in Mosul.127
The impact
of their deaths would take
some time
to assess, although celebrations had been reported.
252.
In the UK’s
Area of Responsibility, an Italian brigade had assumed
responsibility for
Dhi Qar
province.
253.
Cabinet Office
officials told the AHMGIR on 24 July that Mr Vieira de Mello
had
reported to
the UN, welcoming the formation of the Governing
Council.128
He had
called
for a clear
timeline for the transition to a representative government, and for
an Iraqi-led
constitutional
process.
254.
Views within
the GC were divided on timelines for the constitutional reform
process
leading to
elections: some wished to press ahead; others favoured a slower,
more
cautious
approach.
255.
On 24 July,
Ministers agreed that the UK would offer to lead four
Governorate
teams, two
in the South-East, one in the Kurdish area, and one elsewhere in
the Sunni
area “but
not in the less stable central areas around
Baghdad”.129
256.
On 28 July, Lt
Gen Reith set out the results of a Force Level Review for Basra
and
Maysan
provinces in a paper for the Chiefs of Staff.130
257.
As background
to his conclusions, he wrote:
“Following
the incident on 24 Jun, when six RMP were murdered at Al
Majar
al‑Kabir,
the level of tasking for UK forces in Basra and Maysan provinces
has
routinely
exceeded that originally envisaged. GOC 1(UK) Armd Div
conducted
126
Synnott
H. Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. IB Tauris
&
Co Ltd.,
2008.
127
Minutes, 23
July 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
128 Annotated
Agenda, 24 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
129
Minutes, 24
July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
130
Paper CJO,
28 July 2003, ‘Op TELIC – UK Force Level Review in Maysan and
Basrah Provinces’.
248