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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
progress towards five objectives: security; governance; essential services; the
economy; and strategic communications.
“The trouble was that it did not amount to an operational plan of action, only a list of
subsidiary objectives under each of these headings. There were no indications about
how in practice they would be achieved: no details of funding, of personnel involved,
of support systems or of timing. It was particularly notable that the ultimate objective,
of handing full sovereignty back to the Iraqi people, had no timing attached to it
at all.”126
250.  ‘Achieving the Vision’ is described in more detail in Section 10.1.
251.  At the Chiefs of Staff meeting on 23 July Lieutenant General John Reith, Chief of
Joint Operations, reported that Saddam Hussein’s two sons, Qusay and Uday, had been
killed by US forces after a gun battle in Mosul.127 The impact of their deaths would take
some time to assess, although celebrations had been reported.
252.  In the UK’s Area of Responsibility, an Italian brigade had assumed responsibility for
Dhi Qar province.
253.  Cabinet Office officials told the AHMGIR on 24 July that Mr Vieira de Mello had
reported to the UN, welcoming the formation of the Governing Council.128 He had called
for a clear timeline for the transition to a representative government, and for an Iraqi-led
constitutional process.
254.  Views within the GC were divided on timelines for the constitutional reform process
leading to elections: some wished to press ahead; others favoured a slower, more
cautious approach.
255.  On 24 July, Ministers agreed that the UK would offer to lead four Governorate
teams, two in the South-East, one in the Kurdish area, and one elsewhere in the Sunni
area “but not in the less stable central areas around Baghdad”.129
256.  On 28 July, Lt Gen Reith set out the results of a Force Level Review for Basra and
Maysan provinces in a paper for the Chiefs of Staff.130
257.  As background to his conclusions, he wrote:
“Following the incident on 24 Jun, when six RMP were murdered at Al Majar
al‑Kabir, the level of tasking for UK forces in Basra and Maysan provinces has
routinely exceeded that originally envisaged. GOC 1(UK) Armd Div conducted
126  Synnott H. Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq. IB Tauris &
Co Ltd., 2008.
127  Minutes, 23 July 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
128 Annotated Agenda, 24 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
129  Minutes, 24 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
130  Paper CJO, 28 July 2003, ‘Op TELIC – UK Force Level Review in Maysan and Basrah Provinces’.
248
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