9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
628.
Mr Benn
reported to Cabinet that Prime Minister Ja’afari had promised a
new
government
would be formed by the end of April. Dr Reid said that he was
confident that
a
government of national unity would be formed.
629.
By the end of
March, Mr Blair regarded the problem of forming a government
in
Iraq as the
top foreign policy for the UK and US governments.303
630.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald and Mr Straw were to visit Iraq to try and add
momentum to
the
process. Mr Blair did not rule out a personal visit, if it
would help.
631.
Mr Straw
spoke to Secretary Rice on 29 March and agreed that they would
visit
Baghdad
together. Mr Straw observed that they:
“… would
have to threaten the Iraqi leaders that US and UK support was
not
unconditional
and that we might be put in a position where we had to reconsider
our
632.
On 30 March,
Dr Reid reported to DOP(I) that the operational conditions
for
handover in
Maysan and Muthanna existed and that the UK should continue to
press for
an
accelerated process in theatre while showing due concern for the
views of the Iraqis
633.
Mr Blair
did not attend DOP(I) on 30 March.
634.
On the
following day, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary advised the MOD
that Mr Blair
had been
considering the issue of transition in the light of DOP(I)’s
agreement that the
UK should
continue to press for an accelerated transition process
and:
“He feels
strongly that we should avoid pushing too hard on transition
timescales,
and avoid
any appearance that UK planning is based on our own internal
priorities
rather than
those of the Iraqis.”306
635.
The note asked
for an assessment of the realistic timeframe for transition, in
the
light of
the emerging delays to the process, for Mr Blair’s weekend
box.
636.
Mr Blair
postponed a visit to Washington, planned for early April,
because
he believed
that it would be better to wait until after a new Iraqi Government
had
303
Minute
Sheinwald to Straw, 28 March 2006, ‘Iraq’.
304
Letter
Siddiq to Sheinwald, 29 March 2006, ‘The Foreign Secretary’s
Telephone Call with the US
Secretary
of State, 29 March’.
305
Minutes, 30
March 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
306
Letter
Banner to McNeil, 31 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Transition’.
307
Minute
Sheinwald to Phillipson, 29 March 2006, ‘US/UK/Iraq’.
593