10.2  |  Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009

• appoint effective technocrats to replace the “most egregiously partisan” and

underperforming ministers;

• take personal responsibility for Iraq’s engagement with the International

Compact;

• secure agreement on a Hydrocarbons Law;

• push for a full and effective multilateral presence in Iraq;

• start reforming key ministries; and

• get Iraqi resources to the provinces to improve local services and create jobs.

644.  The draft Plan stated that that was an ambitious and complex agenda. Progress

on reform had so far been limited and the UK needed to be realistic about chances of

“widespread success” in the next six months, although traction was improving in some

areas as the quality of Ministers and political leadership improved.

645.  Responding to Mr McDonald, Mr Blair’s Private Secretary reported that he had

described the Forward Plan as “an excellent piece of work”.368 The Private Secretary

asked for the Plan to be finalised and implemented.

646.  No.10 sent the White House a copy of the Forward Plan on 25 November,

stressing that it remained “work in progress”.369

647.  Maj Gen Shirreff’s weekly report of 30 November offered an assessment of

progress on Op SINBAD (two months into the Operation).370 He reported that a great

deal had been achieved:

• Over US$50m had been committed to more than 150 short- and medium-term

projects, creating over 12,000 jobs. The projects had been selected with the

relevant Iraqi authorities; that approach had won public and political consent

at the local, regional and national level.

• There had been an improvement in the general security situation and in the

confidence and capability of the ISF. Further action was needed to reduce

indirect fire and tackle corruption in the Iraq Police Service.

648.  On reconstruction, Maj Gen Shirreff commented:

“… the area that will underwrite the success of Op SINBAD is reconstruction and

economic development. I have previously mentioned the need to fill the gap between

the immediate impact projects of Op SINBAD and whatever longer-term activity is

undertaken by the PRT as well as the requirement to co-ordinate the efforts of the

MOD, FCO and DFID in southern Iraq better, hence recent efforts to breathe life

back into the comprehensive approach before it is completely moribund.”

368  Letter Banner to McDonald, 27 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Forward Plan’.

369  Letter Sheinwald to Hadley, 25 November 2006, [untitled], attaching Note Blair, 27 November 2006,

‘Iraq Forward Plan’ and Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq: Forward Plan’.

370  Report Shirreff, 30 November 2006, ‘GOC(MND)SE – southern Iraq Update – 30 November 2006’.

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