9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
535.
The paper
listed a number of “key activities” to address the action
needed
before PIC,
including opening an Iraqi Army Leadership Academy and
training
centre,
increasing the number of sub‑units available for army training and
mentoring,
establishing
a Leadership Academy for the police, supporting prosecutions for
police
corruption
and increasing police advisory capacity.
536.
On the ability
of MND(SE) to re‑intervene if necessary, the paper
stated:
“In Basra
the effect of closing the bases in the city will be to reduce our
tactical and
situational
awareness, making any re‑intervention high risk.”
537.
A short note
attached as Annex C to the main paper recorded that it would
be
“impossible
to mitigate fully” the “serious implications” on situational
awareness of
leaving
bases within Basra city. The annex said that those risks were
“containable”
post‑PIC,
and that mitigation measures were being “actively and
aggressively
considered”.
538.
The paper
stated that “we should consider retaining a military presence [in
Basra
Palace] at
least until PIC”. If the Basra Palace base was to be retained for
longer
than
planned, “a further UK battlegroup would be required”. The paper
included a
recommendation
that public statements about the future of Basra Palace should
be
avoided,
pending a separate proposal on its future.
539.
The paper
recorded that there were US concerns about the UK’s
plans:
“… General
Casey remains cautious about the timing of PIC in Basra and
Maysan.
He has
expressed serious concerns about our re‑posturing plans, and
there
are
indications that General Petraeus may be more, not less cautious.
Defence
Secretary
Gates has also raised questions.”
540.
US
interlocutors were reported to be concerned that the UK’s plans
signalled a
reduced
commitment to the South, and that they could threaten the integrity
of coalition
and MNF‑I
supply lines. The paper stated:
“It is
important that we are clear about what we are proposing. We
are not
suggesting
that PIC
must happen
in Maysan and Basra on any fixed timetable.
We accept
that the case for moving to PIC in Basra in particular will be
finely
balanced.
Our current assessment is that we have made sufficient progress to
be
confident
that MND(SE) will be able to recommend that Basra can be
transferred
to PIC by
the end of … June. But the final decision will rest with MCNS
[Ministerial
Committee
on National Security] and Maliki, and some of the key actions
needed to
get to PIC
will require Iraqi decisions. Past experience suggests slippage may
well
occur
before formal decisions get taken – indeed it has already done so
for Maysan.
“What we
are saying is that, in the light of progress thus far, and in
anticipation
of PIC, it
makes sense now to set out a programme of change that will
have
demonstrable
impact before PIC, and will pave the way for Iraqi‑led
progress
101