3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
648.
Mr Blair
also said that “A big debate was developing over the value of
the
inspections
route.” He would “report back to colleagues on the outcome” of his
meeting
with
President Bush.
649.
Sir Richard
Dearlove advised on 23 January that the US had “in effect”
taken
the
decision to use force against Iraq.
650.
In response to
a request from Mr Blair for briefing on US planning,
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s
Private Secretary sent Sir David Manning an update, advising
that a decision
had “in
effect” been taken to use force against Iraq.221
The US
military would be ready
in mid‑February.
651.
In a Note
to President Bush on 24 January, Mr Blair told President Bush
that
the need
for a second resolution was overwhelming, and that inspectors
should
be given
until the end of March or early April to carry out their
task.
652.
Mr Blair
suggested that, in the absence of a “smoking gun”, Dr Blix
would
be able
to harden up his findings on the basis of a pattern of
non‑co‑operation
from Iraq
and that would be sufficient for support for military action in
the
Security
Council.
653.
In
addition, Mr Blair framed his argument in the context that
extra time would
be crucial
to make a better case and work up coherent plans for the
“aftermath”
of a
conflict and to secure international support.
654.
Mr Blair
sent a Note to President Bush on 24 January, setting out the
dilemma,
as he
saw it, in the absence of a “smoking gun”.222
655.
Addressing the
question “What’s the problem?”, Mr Blair wrote:
“If we
delay, we risk Saddam messing us about, sucking us back into a game
of hide
and seek
with the Inspectors where, unless they find ‘the smoking gun’, the
thing
drags on
for ever until we give up or get distracted.
“On the
other hand, at present there is not support for a second UN
resolution; and
Blix is not
yet in a clear and unambiguous position on Iraqi
non‑co‑operation.”
656.
Mr Blair
wrote that the arguments for proceeding with the second resolution,
“or at
the very
least a clear statement” from Dr Blix which allowed the US and
UK to argue that
a failure
to pass a second resolution was in breach of the spirit of 1441,
remained in his
view,
overwhelming. He cited six reasons:
•
It would be
“the best protection” in the event of “a military hitch” or
a
protracted campaign.
221
Letter PS/C
to Manning, 23 January 2003, [untitled].
222
Letter
Manning to Rice, 24 January 2003, [untitled], attaching Note [Blair
to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
115