The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
A public
information campaign should be mounted to explain the
nature
of Saddam
Hussein’s regime and the threat he posed.
•
Any
military action would need to be within the framework of
international law.
•
The
military strategy would need to ensure Saddam Hussein could be
removed
quickly and
successfully.
•
A
convincing “blueprint” was needed for a post‑Saddam Hussein Iraq
which
would be
acceptable to both Iraq’s population and its
neighbours.
•
The US
should advance the Middle East Peace Process in order to improve
the
chances of
gaining broad support in the Middle East for military action
against
Iraq; and
to pre‑empt accusations of double standards.
•
Action
should enhance rather than diminish regional
stability.
•
Success
would be needed in Afghanistan to demonstrate the benefits
of
regime change.
80.
Mr Blair
considered that he was seeking to influence US policy by describing
the key
elements
for a successful strategy to secure international support for any
military action
against
Iraq.
81.
Key Ministers
and some of their most senior advisers thought these
were
the conditions
that would need to be met if the UK was to participate in
US‑led
military action.
82.
By July, no
progress had been made on the ultimatum strategy and Iraq was
still
refusing to
admit weapons inspectors as required by resolution 1284
(1999).
83.
The UK
Government was concerned that the US Administration was
contemplating
military
action in circumstances where it would be very difficult for the UK
to participate
in or,
conceivably, to support that action.
84.
To provide the
basis for a discussion with the US, a Cabinet Office paper of
19 July,
‘Iraq:
Conditions for Military Action’, identified the conditions which
would be necessary
before
military action would be justified and the UK could participate in
such action.25
85.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that Mr Blair had said at
Crawford:
“... that
the UK would support military action to bring about regime change,
provided
that
certain conditions were met:
•
efforts had
been made to construct a coalition/shape public
opinion,
•
the
Israel‑Palestine Crisis was quiescent, and
•
the options
for action to eliminate Iraq’s WMD through the UN
weapons
inspectors
had been exhausted.”
25
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
14