The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
40 Commando
had defeated an Iraqi armoured formation that attacked
their
211.
Looking
forward to the next 12 hours, the MOD said that the UK would:
“Maintain
the
Information Operations and media efforts to provide additional
motivation for the
enemy to
capitulate.”
212.
The COBR
update for the night of 25/26 March said that Coalition aircraft
had
attacked
state TV in Baghdad and the Ba’ath Party HQ in Basra
overnight.137
213.
Mr Scarlett
informed the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq on 26 March that the
situation
inside
Basra was unclear, although desertions from the Iraqi Regular Army
and the
militias
were on the increase.138
214.
Adm Boyce said
that the operational pause in the main Coalition thrust
towards
Baghdad,
which coincided with the bad weather, would come to an end
shortly.
215.
At their
meeting on 26 March, the Chiefs of Staff were told that the
position of
Basra
continued to attract media attention.139
The
beginnings of a civil uprising in Basra
had been
reported, but its extent was unknown. Lt Gen Reith described the
situation in
the
vicinity of Basra as:
“… complex,
and further complicated by the possibility that the Land Cdr [Lt
Gen
McKiernan]
might require 7 Arm[oure]d B[riga]de to deploy north to assist in
the
battle for
Baghdad. GOC 1 Div [Maj Gen Brims] assessed that UK forces
could
not secure
Basra without the support of a popular uprising inside the city
…”
216.
Adm Boyce
directed that: “Ministers would need to be apprised of the
difficulties
surrounding
the Basra issue.”
217.
Air Marshal
Sir Joe French, the Chief of Defence Intelligence, said that Iraqi
TV
was back on
the air; it continued to play a key role in maintaining regime
authority and
was
instrumental in controlling the population and undermining the
Coalition.
218.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussion about the tension between the UK desire to
reduce
troop
levels and the potential demand for troops for Phase IV and US
expectations is
addressed
later in this Section.
219.
On 26 March,
Mr Watkins asked Mr Lee for advice on
Basra.140
He
wrote:
“Ministers
have been informed that the CFLCC would prefer 7 Armoured
Brigade
not to
enter Basra so that it could remain available to reinforce the US
advance on
136
Briefing
[MOD], 25 March 2003 ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – as at
1700Z 25 March 2003’.
137
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Manning, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
COBR overnight sitrep –
25/26 March’.
138
Minutes, 26
March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.
139
Minutes, 26
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
140
Minute
PS/SofS [MOD] to DG Op Pol, 26 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Dealing with
Basrah’.
38